Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist Lessons for Copyright Law by Craig, Carys J.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship
2007
Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist
Lessons for Copyright Law
Carys J. Craig
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, ccraig@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Craig, Carys J. "Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist Lessons for Copyright Law." Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the
Law 15.2 (2007): 207-268.
207
RECONSTRUCTING THE AUTHOR-
SELF: SOME FEMINIST LESSONS FOR 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
CARYS J. CRAIG∗ 
I. Constructing Authorship: The Underlying Philosophy of the 
Copyright Model.............................................................................208 
    A. Introduction.......................................................................................208 
    B. Authorship, Origination, and Objectification....................................209 
1. The “Author” ................................................................................211
2. Propertization and the Concept of the “Work” .............................219
    C. The Practical and Political Consequences for Copyright..................224 
1. The Author Function at Work.......................................................225
2. Authors and Imitators ...................................................................228
    D. Conclusions on Copyright’s Authorship Construct ..........................232 
II. Authorship and Conceptions of the Self: A Feminist Inquiry into
the Processes of Creativity..............................................................233 
    A. Introducing Feminist Theory ............................................................233 
    B. Feminism, Authorship, and Constructions of the Self ......................235 
    C. Feminist Literary Criticism and the Author-Self ..............................238 
1. The Dilemma for Feminist Literary Theory ..................................238
2. Introducing Dialogism...................................................................242
3. Dialogism, Authorship, and Copyright..........................................244
    D. Feminist Theory and the Atomistic Self ...........................................248 
1. Political Theory, Copyright, and the Self ......................................248
2. Political Theory and the Feminist Dilemma ..................................250
3. Relational Feminism: Rethinking the Self.....................................254
a. The Relational Self ....................................................................255
∗Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.  LL.B (Hons), LL.M., S.J.D.  I would like 
to thank Jennifer Nedelsky, Abraham Drassinower, and Julie Cohen for their comments on 
earlier versions of this article.  I am also grateful to the organizers of the IP/Gender: The 
Unmapped Connections conference at the Washington College of Law, May 2006, for the 
opportunity to present this work, and to the participants of the conference for their feedback 
and encouragement. In particular, thanks go to Victoria Phillips, Christine Haight Farley, 
Peter Jaszi, and Dan Burk. 
208 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 15:2 
b. Rights as Relationship ...............................................................257
c. Dialogic Communitarianism......................................................258
4. Relational Theory, Authorship, and Copyright ............................261
a. The Relational Author................................................................261
b. Relational Copyright..................................................................263
c. Authorship as Dialogic Process .................................................265
III. Conclusion: A Feminist Theory of Authorship and Copyright ...........266
I. CONSTRUCTING AUTHORSHIP: THE UNDERLYING PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
COPYRIGHT MODEL 
A. Introduction 
The theoretical framework of intellectual property law, and copyright 
law in particular, is premised upon liberal and neo-liberal assumptions.  At 
the core of copyright’s functionality are the concepts of private rights, 
property, ownership, exclusion, and individualism.  At the core of 
copyright’s justifications are the concepts of individual entitlement or 
desert, on one hand, and economic rationality and self-interest on the other. 
Within this model, authors are individuated, proprietary personalities with a 
claim to ownership of their intellectual works; these works are the original, 
stable, and propertizable results of the authors’ independent efforts.1  Far 
from a situated, communicative act, the authorial activity presupposed by 
intellectual property is an individual act that produces a commodifiable 
thing and, of course, a right against all others in relation to that thing. 
My aim in this paper is to explore the weaknesses inherent in the law’s 
construction of authorship.  Legal doctrine has a self-perpetuating power: 
the power to naturalize its constructions and cement its abstractions.2 I will 
argue that copyright’s reduction and individualization of authorial activity 
threatens to obscure the “communicative function of authorship”3 and to 
undermine its role in dialogic community.  Copyright’s construction of 
authorship and its focus upon the abstract, individual rights-bearer, 
therefore, threatens to obscure the social purposes of the copyright system 
and to undermine its attempts to encourage cultural creativity. 
This paper consists of two parts.  In Part I, I examine the romantic 
1. See GRANTLAND S. RICE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AUTHORSHIP IN AMERICA 76
(1997). 
2. Id. at 73 (noting the criticism launched by Dierdrich Knickerbocker against “the
‘naturalizing’ tendency of the explanatory power of legal doctrines”).  According to 
Knickerbocker, we are told, legal theories “only distort and create illusions while ‘gravely 
accounting for unaccountable things.’”  Id. (quoting ROBERTSON A. FERGUSON, LAW AND
LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 158 (1984)). 
3. Id. at 70.
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conception of authorship that pervades the doctrinal constructs and 
application of copyright law, a conception that dichotomizes origination 
and imitation, while individualizing the author and propertizing his 
product.  I also explore the post-romantic critiques to which scholars have 
subjected this vision of authorship.  I will then identify some of the 
practical and political consequences of the romantic author in the copyright 
realm, focusing upon its tendency to support broad protection for “original” 
authors, while chilling downstream uses and silencing cultural exchange. 
In Part II, I will attempt to establish a route towards re-imagining 
copyright’s author, employing feminist literary and political theory to 
reveal the author as a relational self and the nature of authorship as a 
communicative and dialogic process.  This theory of the author-self paves 
the way towards the re-imagination of a copyright system justified in terms 
of the social good that resides in communication and cultural exchange of 
meaning. 
B. Authorship, Origination, and Objectification 
Authorship is the foundation of copyright.  It is authorship that brings 
into existence the copyrightable work, authorship that establishes the 
copyright interest, and authorship that determines the first owner of the 
copyright.4  Authorship is therefore a “bedrock principle” of copyright,5 
and yet, contrary to the immutability and solidity that this might suggest, it 
is “[o]ne of the more elusive concepts in copyright law”6 (which is already 
full of elusive concepts).  Recognizing the centrality of the concept of 
authorship to the operation and application of copyright law reveals the 
extent to which our copyright model is guided and shaped by our 
interpretation of this elusive concept.  This in turn reveals that an inquiry 
into the nature, processes, and products of authorship affords the 
opportunity to rethink the shape of copyright protection. 
In his seminal essay “What Is an Author?” Michel Foucault insisted “it 
would be worth examining how the author became individualized in a 
culture like ours . . . and how this fundamental category of ‘the-man-and-
4. See, e.g., Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 13.1 (1985) (Can.) (“Subject to this
Act, the author of a work shall be the first owner of the copyright therein.”).  The Act 
provides no definition of “the author.”  References in this article will be to the Canadian 
copyright legislation.  However, these references are only intended to be illustrative, and 
equivalent provisions and examples can be found in other common law jurisdictions.  See, 
e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-109 (2006) (granting U.S. copyright protection to “works of
authorship”). 
5. Alan L. Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and Indeterminacy, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 569, 571 (2002) (discussing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340 (1991)). 
6. Id.
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his-work criticism’ began.”7  Recently, this challenge has been taken up by 
intellectual property scholars, perhaps most notably Martha Woodmansee 
and Mark Rose, who have produced important texts on the development of 
the modern concept of authorship in eighteenth century Germany and 
Britain respectively.8 
These examinations reveal the extent to which the modern concept of the 
author as the sole independent creator of an original work is profoundly 
ideological and historical.9 Through a process of contextualization—
locating modern concepts of assumed meaning within the “worlds of 
significance” in which these meanings developed—such scholarship has 
brought attention to “just how culturally specific and historically contingent 
such seemingly transparent terms actually are, and how complex the 
contexts in which they emerged, were contested, and gained legitimacy.”10  
This recent body of academic literature has provided an important route 
towards the doctrinal reconfiguration of copyright law by anatomizing the 
author and demythologizing copyright doctrine.  I will explore this route—
its justifications and implications—in the discussion that follows. In 
particular, I hope to show that copyright’s current author-figure is both 
                                                          
 7. MICHEL FOUCAULT, What Is an Author?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 101, 101 (Paul 
Rabinov ed., 1984). 
 8. See THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND 
LITERATURE (Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee eds., Duke Univ. Press 1994) (1992); 
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993) [hereinafter 
ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS]; Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket 
and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51, 76 (1988) [hereinafter 
Rose, The Author as Proprietor]; MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART AND THE 
MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS (1994); see also Carla Hesse, 
Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in Revolutionary France, 1777-
1793, 30 REPRESENTATIONS (SPECIAL ISSUE) 109, 130 (1990) (defining “[t]he author as a 
legal instrument for the regulation of knowledge . . . created by the absolutist monarchy . . . 
that exercised power through privilege rather than by a constitutional regime”); Molly 
Nesbitt, What Was an Author?, 73 YALE FRENCH STUD. 229, 230 (1987) (stating that all 
authors are “equated in the law . . . [as a person] given rights to a cultural space over which 
he or she may range and work”); Mark Rose, The Author in Court: Pope v Curll (1741), 21 
CULTURAL CRITIQUE 197, 198 (1992) (noting that in England, the legal empowerment of the 
author as an owner of property preceded the social creation of professional authorship); 
Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of 
the Emergence of the “Author,” 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 434 (1984) 
[hereinafter Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright] (describing the process before the 
enactment of copyright laws in Germany through which authors received honoraria of 
recognition from publishers for works they agreed to print). 
 9. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of 
Possessing Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J.L. 
& JURISPRUDENCE 249, 285 (1993) (“The range of Western beliefs that define intellectual 
and cultural property laws—that ideas can easily be separated from expressions, that 
expressions are the singular products of the individual minds of Romantic authors, and that 
these expressive works can be abstracted from the meaningful worlds in which they figure 
to circulate as the signs of unique personality . . . are not universal values that express the 
full range of human possibility, but particular, interested fictions.”). 
 10. Rosemary Coombe, Challenging Paternity: Histories of Copyright, 6 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 397, 398 (1994) (book review). 
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facilitative and symptomatic of its larger ideological framework and to 
suggest that this figure/framework limits our ability to comprehend the 
cultural creativity central to copyright’s claims.  In Part I, I will turn my 
attention to the task of reconfiguring copyright’s author, retrieving the 
author from the myths that have defined him.  Having set about 
understanding the past behind the modern conception of authorship, it 
should become possible to re-imagine its future.11 
1. The “Author” 
Present-day copyright law emerged out of commercial struggles amongst 
interested parties, occurring at a time and context specific moment in the 
process of cultural and economic development.12  It is against this picture 
of historical contingency that the connection between the romantic author 
and property theory becomes most evident.  I do not pretend to offer here a 
comprehensive account of the formation of the modern representation of 
the author,13 but it is crucial to recognize that, in spite of its apparent 
naturalness in the modern age, the modern author “is a relatively recent 
invention.”14  According to Woodmansee, the modern author is the product 
of the professionalization of writing that accompanied the growth of public 
literacy in the eighteenth century.15  German theorists, elaborating upon the 
positions taken by English writers such as Edward Young and William 
Wordsworth, attempted to dislocate the notion of the writer as a master of 
rules or a receptacle of sublime inspiration in favor of the concept of 
internalized inspiration or “original genius.”16  The writer was thereby 
                                                          
 11. See Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective 
Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 293 (1991). 
 12. See RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE 
MOVEMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1695-1775) 37-38 
(2004).  See generally L. RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968) 
(providing an excellent account of the historical development of copyright). 
 13. See MARILYN RANDALL, PRAGMATIC PLAGIARISM: AUTHORSHIP, PROFIT AND POWER 
58 (2001) (examining the historical and ideological development of the idea of authorship 
and defining it “as the attribution of a particular set of authorial functions to the agent of 
discourse”). 
 14. Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright, supra note 8, at 426. 
 15. See id. (describing how German writers who were unable to survive on writing 
alone sought to redefine the nature of writing to ameliorate their financial position in 
society). 
 16. See id. at 446; see also ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS, supra note 8, at 118 (noting 
that the commercial value of writing often influences discussions of the work’s literary 
value); Edward Young, Conjectures on Original Composition: In a Letter to the Author of 
Sir Charles Grandison, in ENGLISH CRITICAL ESSAYS: SIXTEENTH, SEVENTIETH AND 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 270, 289 (Edmund D. Jones ed., 1975) (emphasizing concepts of 
ownership, advising writers to “thyself so reverence, as to prefer the native growth of thy 
own mind . . . . The man who thus reverences himself, will soon find the world’s reverence 
to follow his own.  His works will stand distinguished; his the sole property of them; which 
property alone can confer the noble title of an author” (emphasis added)); Essay, 
Supplementary to the Preface, in LITERARY CRITICISM OF WILLIAM WORDSWORTH 182, 184 
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transformed “into a individual uniquely responsible for a unique product.  
That is, from a (mere) vehicle of preordained truths . . . the writer becomes 
an author (Lat. auctor, originator, founder, creator).”17 
The exaltation of “original” texts is also a relatively recent phenomenon: 
the idea of an “author” as a “maker” of an “original” text would have been 
alien to literary thought in the classical period.18  Indeed, at this time, 
copying or imitating the great poets and writers that had gone before was 
considered a worthy objective and, if done successfully, an admirable 
achievement.19  Marilyn Randall explains that, while prior to the eighteenth 
century “imitation was the aesthetic norm,”20 the eighteenth century saw a 
“shift from a poetics of imitation to a valorization of originality.”21 
Aspirations of imagination, novelty, creativity, and originality were of 
growing importance in the aesthetics of the Romantic period, which 
emphasized the individual author and the authority that flows from 
personal genius and sincere expression.22  At the heart of the Romantic 
ideal is the sanctity of individual creativity.  The distinction between 
imitation and originality is therefore intricately tied to the perceived nature 
of man, such that true authorship represents the essence of human 
individuality.23  The human agent, as author, does not copy without 
sacrificing his authenticity and obscuring his intrinsic worth.  “Authorship 
                                                          
(Paul M. Zall ed., 1966) (quoting Wordsworth’s observation that “[o]f genius the only proof 
is, the act of doing well what is worthy to be done, and what was never done before . . . . 
Genius is the introduction of a new element into the intellectual universe”). 
 17. Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright, supra note 8, at 429. 
 18. See id. at 442. 
 19. See id. at 443; see also Longinus, On the Sublime, in CRITICAL THEORY SINCE 
PLATO 76, 83-84 (Hazard Adams ed., 1992) (“This writer shows us, if only we were willing 
to pay him heed, that another way . . . leads to the sublime . . . .  It is the imitation and 
emulation of previous great poets and writers . . . .  This proceeding is not plagiarism; it is 
like taking an impression from beautiful forms or figures or other works of art.”). 
 20. RANDALL, supra note 13, at 72.  When imitation was the norm, the authority or 
originality of the work depended upon the quality of the imitation, its authenticity, and the 
legitimacy of the influence.  Id. at 32.  This is in contrast to the aesthetics of the eighteenth 
century, which saw “the connotations of authority recast in the form of personal genius and 
inspiration, and the connotations of authenticity, born of the sincerity of expression of the 
individual and of the intimate connection between product and producer.”  Id. at 51. 
 21. See id. at 47. 
 22. See id. at 47-48 (quoting ROLAND MORTIER, L’ORIGINALITÉ: UNE NOUVELLE 
CATÉGORIE ESTHÉTIQUE AU SIÈCLE DES LUMIÈRES 134-35 (1982)) (“‘The novelty brought 
about by the eighteenth century was the preference accorded to direct and immediate 
expression that was faithful and sincere to feelings and ideas.  The fact of borrowing 
images, formal schemas, and existing structures will be considered as an infraction of that 
sincerity.’”). 
 23. See id. at 49-50 (noting that qualities that are learned and acquired over our lifetime 
are thereby regarded as stifling an innate quality that is original and authentic); Young, 
supra note 16, at 283 (portraying originality as unlearned and innate to the nature of man).  
Young famously wrote, “Born originals, how comes it to pass that we die copies?”  Id. at 
285. 
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retains, in the eighteenth century, both the connotations of authority recast 
in the form of personal genius and inspiration, and the connotations of 
authenticity, born of the sincerity of expression of the individual and of the 
intimate connection between product and producer.”24 
In the nineteenth century, the addition of what Randall terms the “great 
author” phenomenon compounded the concept of individual authorship.25  
Originality came to be regarded as the mark of an individual’s genius and 
greatness particular to him.26  Consequently, imitation signified inferior or 
“failed authorship,”27 presumably by a lesser person.  A great author was a 
“great soul emitting inspired and universal truths,”28 while lesser humans 
could merely follow suit by learning, imitating, and borrowing.29  Viewed 
as such, the originator has a personal and moral claim to right that is not 
shared by the imitator, and indeed, the imitator threatens to undermine the 
originator’s claim: imitation is thus the “scourge” of great literature.30 
The valorization of the individual author and his originality, and the 
resulting denigration of imitation that is captured in this description of 
nineteenth century authorship, is axiomatic in modern copyright law.  
Copyright’s subject is the author-as-originator.  The “author” is defined by 
and rewarded because of the “originality” of his creation,31 with the essence 
of copyright’s standard of originality being independent production.32  And, 
of course, the unworthy imitator is copyright’s infringer.33 
                                                          
 24. RANDALL, supra note 13, at 51. 
 25. Id. at 54. 
 26. Id. at 51. 
 27. Id. at 52. 
 28. Id. at 54. 
 29. Id. at 50 (differentiating between learned knowledge, ability, and innate genius, 
stating “genius is from Heaven, learning from man . . . .  Learning is borrowed knowledge; 
genius is knowledge innate, and quite our own”). 
 30. See id. at 51 (translating PIERRE LAROUSSE, GRAND DICTIONNAIRE UNIVERSEL DU 
19ÈME SIÈCLE (1866)) (noting that imitation is “‘the most fertile source of literature,’ which 
‘is also its scourge’”). 
 31. See Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42 § 5.1 (1985) (“Subject to this Act, copyright 
shall subsist in Canada, for the term hereinafter mentioned, in every original literary, 
dramatic, musical and artistic work.” (emphasis added)); Carys J. Craig, The Evolution of 
Originality in Canadian Copyright Law:  Authorship, Reward, and the Public Interest, 2 U. 
OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 425, 444 (2005) (discussing the meaning of “originality” in Canada 
and its connection to theories of authorial right elsewhere). 
 32. See Univ. of London Press, Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial Press, Ltd., (1916) 2 Ch. 601, 
608-09 (U.K.) (holding that, at its most minimal, originality “does not require that the 
expression must be in an original or novel form, but that the work must not be copied from 
another work—that it should originate from the author”). 
 33. See R.S.C., ch. C-42 §§ 2, 3.1 (determining that the copyright owner has “the sole 
right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form 
whatever,” and that “any copy, including any colourable imitation” of a work in which 
copyright subsists is “infringing”); R.S.C., ch. C-42 § 27.1 (announcing that it is an 
infringement of copyright for any person to do, without the consent of the owner of the 
copyright, anything that only the owner of the copyright has the right to do). 
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It is true that copyright does not concern itself with questions of genius, 
quality, or even creativity: it attaches to the most mundane of works,34 
resists inquiry into the objective value of the author’s contribution,35 and 
offers protection to works that demonstrate either the merest spark of 
creative effort, or sometimes, none at all.  Thus, for example, a person in 
Canada exerting only a minimal (if more than trivial) amount of skill or 
judgment in additions or alterations to pre-existing works can nevertheless 
claim the title of “author” and ownership of her copyrightable 
contribution.36  The fact that she copies a substantial portion of another’s 
work does not negate her own authorial contribution.  Furthermore, the law 
makes some allowances for such downstream uses of protected works by 
limiting infringement to cases of “substantial” copying37 and even by 
permitting substantial copying for certain specific purposes.38 
While these features of the modern copyright system would seem to 
imply that copyright’s author is in fact very far from the individual genius 
postulated in Romantic rhetoric, this apparent disparity simply reflects a 
divergence between copyright’s reality and its guiding rationale.  In reality, 
the copyright system does not demand that the “author” be the equivalent 
                                                          
 34. See, e.g., Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Telestra Corp., (2002) 119 F.C.R. 491 
(Austl.) (finding that copyright protection attached to telephone directories); Ladbroke 
(Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1963] 1 W.L.R. 273 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from C.A.) (U.K.) (attaching copyright to betting coupons).  Copyright is not reserved for 
“works of art” or “literature” within the ordinary meaning of such terms:  it will vest equally 
in a child’s scribble and a great painting, a grocery list and a great novel. 
 35. See Univ. of London Press, 2 Ch. at 608 (suggesting that courts have resisted 
inquiring into the artistic or literary quality or merit of a work when establishing whether the 
subject matter is one to which copyright attaches and that “the words ‘literary work’ cover 
work which is expressed in print or writing, irrespective of the question whether the quality 
or style is high.  The word ‘literary’ . . . refers to written or printed matter”); see also DRG 
Inc. v. Datafile Ltd., [1991] 35 C.P.R. (3d) 243 (Can.) (observing that “artistic work” is used 
merely as a generic description of the type of works which find expression in a visual 
medium). 
 36. See e.g., CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] S.C.R. 339 (Can.) 
(“[A]n ‘original’ work under the Copyright Act is one that originates from an author and is 
not copied from another work.  In addition, an original work must be the product of an 
author's exercise of skill and judgment.  The exercise of skill and judgment required to 
produce the work must not be so trivial that it could be characterized as a purely mechanical 
exercise.”).  Applying this standard, plaintiffs were held to have copyright in reported 
judicial decisions by virtue of having arranged the case summary, catchlines, case title, and 
case information in a specific manner, although they did not have copyright in the judicial 
reasons themselves.  Id. 
 37. See R.S.C., ch. C-42 § 3.1 (granting to authors rights over their work “or a 
substantial part thereof”); see, e.g., Preston v. 20th Century Fox Can. Ltd., [1990] 33 C.P.R. 
(3d) 242 (Can.) (clarifying that if the portion used by the defendant is not either qualitatively 
or quantitatively a substantial part of the protected work, there is no infringement). 
 38. See R.S.C., ch. C-42 § 29 (expressing some limitations and exceptions to the rights 
of copyright owners for research or private study, such as defenses for fair dealing with 
copyrighted works, criticism or review, and news reporting, subject to certain conditions).  
Other available exceptions address specific uses that may be made of protected works by 
educational institutions, libraries, archives, and museums.  R.S.C., ch. C-42 § 30. 
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of the “great man” eruditely writing in his garret, nor does it ask that the 
“original” work represent his novel or brilliant musings.  Equally, the 
system does not deny the possibility of some copying and derivative use by 
authors and others.  Indeed, as Jessica Litman has argued, the copyright 
fiction of “original” authorship is sustainable because copyright law 
concedes the concept of a public domain upon which authors are free to 
draw.39  The argument, however, is that these ideals of individual 
origination inform our sense of the author’s right, and so have become 
engrained in the underlying rationale of the copyright system.  This, in turn, 
defines the way in which that system works. 
Let us return to the proposition that copyright’s subject is the author-as-
originator: the “author” is defined by, and rewarded because of, the 
“originality” of his creation,40 with the essence of copyright’s standard of 
originality being that of independent production.  Irrespective of whether 
copyright doctrine requires creativity, skill, or merely labor, the 
copyrightable work must “originate” from the author and must not be 
copied from any other source.41  Only those elements of the downstream 
author’s work that are said to be original to that author, in this sense, shall 
fall within the monopoly that copyright provides.42  It is true that none of 
these requirements in fact demands a demonstration of genuinely de novo 
origination, but once declared “original,” the difference between reality and 
rhetoric is easily forgotten.43 
And what of the second proposition, that the unworthy imitator is 
copyright’s infringer?  It is true that the downstream author who copies 
substantially from another may also be an original “author,” but that her 
relevant role in the copyright scheme is now that of an “infringer”: a 
permanent injunction can be issued to restrain her from continued use of 
                                                          
 39. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1023 (1990) (“The public 
domain . . . permits us to continue to exalt originality without acknowledging that our claims 
to take originality seriously are mostly pretense.  It furnishes a crucial device to an 
otherwise unworkable system by reserving the raw material of authorship to the commons, 
thus leaving that raw material available for other authors to use.  The public domain thus 
permits the law of copyright to avoid a confrontation with the poverty of some of the 
assumptions on which it is based.”). 
 40. See Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42 § 5.1 (1985); Carys J. Craig, The Evolution of 
Originality in Canadian Copyright Law:  Authorship, Reward, and the Public Interest, 2 U. 
OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 425, 444 (2005). 
 41. CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] S.C.R. 339 (Can.). 
 42. See, e.g., id. (determining that, with respect to compilations of judicial opinions, the 
judicial reasons without the headnotes are not original works in which the publishers could 
claim copyright, and that it would not be copyright infringement for someone to reproduce 
only the judicial reasons). 
 43. Of course, it can be said that nothing is truly “original” in this sense, and that 
“independent creation” is no more than a legal fiction employed to permit the existence of a 
copyright system, amongst other things.  But the more that we are told the same story, the 
more real it becomes. 
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the infringing work as a whole, and an order can be made for surrender of 
any infringing copies.44  While copyright law permits insubstantial 
copying, the substantiality of the taking is determined not with reference to 
the totality of the downstream work, but instead with reference to the 
original protected work: no infringer can avoid liability by pointing to what 
she has created in addition to what she has copied.45  And while even 
substantial copying may be permitted in some circumstances, such 
circumstances are unduly limited, and defenses for prima facie 
infringements are rarely successful.46 
With these considerations in mind, it seems that the copyright system is 
built around the moral divide between original (independent) authorship 
and downstream (derivative) expression.47  However, the moral divide 
between author and copier, between origination and imitation, is as 
untenable in today’s “post-modernity” as it was in the literary aesthetics of 
pre-Romantic eras.  It captures and hypostasizes a moment in the evolution 
of authorship; and that moment has passed. 
In 1968, Roland Barthes famously declared the “death of the author.”48  
This pronouncement did not signal the death of the author concept per se, 
but rather the demise of its Romantic and post-Romantic 
conceptualization.49  In repudiating this instantiation of the author-figure, 
post-structuralist literary theory undermined the significance of the 
“biographical author-person” and “the confidence placed in individual 
                                                          
 44. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42 § 39.1 (1985); see Horn Abbott Ltd. v. W.B. 
Coulter Sales Ltd., [1984] 77 C.P.R. (2d) 145 (Can.) (determining that in the case of 
copyright, actual damage need not be proved because the right of the owner of a copyright is 
not measured by the amount of the actual damage suffered).  Copyright is a type of property 
and the owner is entitled to protection of that property.  Id.  If infringement is proven, an 
injunction will issue without evidence of actual damage.  Id. 
 45. C. P. Koch Ltd. v. Cont’l Steel Ltd., [1984] 82 C.P.R. (2d) 156, 164 (Can.) 
(“Whether copying of some substantial part has or has not occurred is a fact which must be 
determined in the light of all circumstances.  However, it is no defence that a defendant may 
have added original material of his own to an original work copied.”). 
 46. Carys J. Craig, The Changing Face of Fair Dealing in Canadian Copyright Law: A 
Proposal for Legislative Reform, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 437, 445 (Michael Geist ed., 2005). 
 47. See RANDALL, supra note 13, at 77. 
 48. ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 142, 148 
(Stephen Heath trans., 1977). 
 49. See RANDALL, supra note 13, at 57 (“The notion of the individual ‘author’ that 
emerged, and that Barthes and others take to be the one which died—or was put to death—
at the end of the 1960s, is only a moment in [the historical evolution that ‘our society’ 
underwent from the Middle Ages through to the Enlightenment], hypostasized as its final—
or essential—form.”).  Notwithstanding the death of the author identified by Barthes then, 
Randall insists, “[t]he Author is alive and well in contemporary aesthetics, as well as in 
contemporary literary theory and criticism, surviving as a network of functions that, if one 
abstracts the historically brief —and illusory—moment of the Romantic fetishization of 
‘original genius,’ are not remarkably different from those traditionally attributed to 
authorship.”  Id. at 59. 
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agency and control over discourse that involves, inevitably, a belief in the 
possibility of creative originality.”50  The contemporary demystification of 
authorship insists upon the “practical impossibility” of independent 
creation and declares that all texts are necessarily reproductions of other 
texts:51 it is in the nature of expression and cultural development that the 
new builds upon the old.52  Regarded in this light, the act of writing 
involves not origination, but rather translation and recombination of “raw 
material” taken from previously existing texts.  In Jessica Litman’s words, 
authorship is essentially a “process of adapting, transforming, and 
recombining what is already ‘out there’ in some other form.”53  What we 
hail as “creativity” is really the result of “a combination of absorption, 
astigmatism, and amnesia.”54  In Barthes’ vision, 
[t]he text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of 
culture . . . the writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, 
never original.  His only power is to mix writings, to counter the ones 
with the others, in such a way as never to rest on any one of them.55 
To the extent that we accept this description of the creative process, the 
label of “originality” can do little more than legitimize (and valorize) texts 
“that draw[] on a broad range of anonymous textual material over [texts 
that draw] only on identifiable sources.”56  This may appear to be an 
arbitrary basis upon which to determine a text’s worth, but it is the gold 
standard for copyrightability in a copyright system that clings to the vision 
of the author as creator ex nihilo.57 
In light of such reasoning, it has become a fairly common feature of 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 28. 
 51. Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of 
the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725, 756-57 (1993) (asserting that texts are necessarily 
“reproductions” of other texts, not in the legal sense of having reproduced a substantial part 
of any particular pre-existing work, but in the sense that they derive from, draw upon, and 
incorporate within them, an unspecifiable array of pre-existing texts that have influenced 
and shaped the author and the cultural standpoint from which she speaks).  “It is hardly 
possible to accept a critical view which confuses the original with the aboriginal, and 
imagines that a ‘creative’ poet sits with a pencil and some blank paper and eventually 
produces a new poem in a special act of creation ex nihilo.  Human beings do not create in 
that way.  Just as a new scientific discovery manifests something that was already latent in 
the order of nature, and at the same time is logically related to the total structure of the 
existing science, so the new poem manifests something that was already latent in the order 
of words . . . .  Poetry can only be made out of other poems; novels out of other novels.”  Id. 
at 756 (quoting NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM: FOUR ESSAYS 97 (1957)). 
 52. Alan L. Durham, Copyright and Information Theory: Toward an Alternative Model 
of “Authorship,” 2004 BYU L. REV. 69, 94. 
 53. Litman, supra note 39, at 967. 
 54. Id. at 1011. 
 55. BARTHES, supra note 48, at 146. 
 56. See Rotstein, supra note 51, at 757-58. 
 57. See id. at 756. 
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critical copyright scholarship to assert that the Romantic aesthetic is 
responsible for the shape of copyright law and its conception of 
authorship.58  The extent to which the law commits modern copyright to a 
Romantic ideology remains a subject for discussion,59 but there is little 
doubt that copyright law reinforces an exclusionary ideal of the individual 
author that reflects a particular ideology and a particular locus in history.  
While copyright readily extends protection to the banal and 
commonplace—works that are undoubtedly far from the level of romantic 
aspiration—the label of “author” and its concomitant romanticization 
ensure that these uninspired works are nevertheless over-protected, and that 
such “original authorship” is disproportionately valued against excluded 
forms of cultural expression.  Indeed, the less copyright’s subject-matter 
looks like the creation of a Romantic author, the more powerful is the role 
of Romantic ideology in maintaining the moral divide between author and 
                                                          
 58. This line of argument—insisting that the Romantic authorship concept continues to 
function and define our law—has been most famously pursued by James D. A. Boyle.  See, 
e.g., JAMES D. A. BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996) [hereinafter BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND 
SPLEENS]; James D. A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 
AM. U. L. REV. 625, 631 (1988) [hereinafter Boyle, The Search for an Author] (proffering 
that the Romantic “conception of the status of authorship, of the relationship of art to 
commerce, of the illegitimacy of ‘borrowing’ from other works—is actually a comparatively 
modern one”); see also Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, The Ethical Reaches of 
Authorship, 95 S. ATLANTIC Q. 947, 948 (1996) (discussing how intellectual property law 
evolved alongside of and, to a surprising degree, in dialogue with Romantic literary theory, 
especially dealing with Continental authors’ rights); Peter Jaszi, Towards a Theory of 
Copyright: The Metamorphosis of Authorship, 1991 DUKE L.J. 445, 456 [hereinafter Jaszi, 
Towards a Theory of Copyright] (”Law’s reception of ‘authorship’ began well before the 
heyday of Romanticism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  But . . . it is 
not coincidental that precisely this period saw the articulation of many doctrinal structures 
that dominate copyright today.  In fact, British and American copyright presents myriad 
reflections of the Romantic conception of ‘authorship’—even if they sometimes remind one 
of images in fun-house mirrors.”). 
 59. See Anne Barron, Copyright Law and the Claims of Art, 2002 INTELL. PROP. Q. 368, 
369 (arguing that “copyright law’s debt to Romanticism has been vastly overstated”).  
Barron contends that this overstatement is the result of an excessive focus upon the subject 
of copyright (the author) at the expense of the object of copyright (the protected work).  Id.  
The connection between copyright discourse and aesthetic theory is best seen in copyright’s 
definition of the “work,” which reflects “if anything a Modernist—not a Romantic—
aesthetic.”  Id. at 370.  This is an interesting critique of the anti-Romanticist position, but I 
would tend to support the centrality of the author to copyright’s doctrinal form and regard 
the construction of the “work” as a consequence thereof.  The mistaken notion of the work 
as “stable, fixed, closed, self-contained, and autonomous of its context and audience” seems 
to me to flow from the propertization of the intellectual work, which relies in part upon the 
individuation and origination reflected in copyright’s version of authorship.  See id.; see 
also Boyle, The Search for an Author, supra note 58, at 629 (“This transcendental insight or 
genius [presumed by the Romantic model] plays a very important role in establishing the 
author as the ruler of the text.  It ‘goes without saying’ that the author’s interpretation 
governs because it is the author’s genius, the author’s special knowledge, which created this 
piece of art ex nihilo.”); Jaszi, Towards a Theory of Copyright, supra note 58, at 472 (“The 
‘authorship’ concept, with its roots in notions of individual self-proprietorship, provided the 
rationale for thinking of literary productions as personal property with various associated 
attributes including alienability.”). 
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copier. 
It should be evident that there is nothing natural or necessary about the 
particular conception of authorship embraced by the current copyright 
model.  With this acknowledgement comes the space to ask about the 
appropriate conception of authorship for the purposes of copyright and to 
inquire into the kinds of cultural creativity and communicative activity that 
the current concept excludes (or even precludes).  Randall defines 
authorship as “the attribution of a particular set of authorial functions to 
[an] agent of discourse.”60  If this is the transhistorical significance of 
authorship, then the label of “author” performs a function; it does not state 
a fact.  It must be asked, then, what function does copyright’s version of 
authorship perform? 
2. Propertization and the Concept of the “Work” 
With the transformation from inspired imitator to original creator 
complete, it seems clear that “the writer’s claim to a property interest, 
particularly one based on natural rights, becomes more credible.”61  As 
Randall notes, “[t]he theme of intellectual production as property is never 
very far from the concerns of those involved with defending literary ethics 
and aesthetics.”62  If the triumvirate of authority, authenticity, and 
originality make up the essential elements of authorship,63 a crucial fourth 
element is that of ownership.  The enduring relationship between 
authorship and ownership suggests a link between the emergence of the 
modern author-figure and the acceptance of proprietorship in the literary 
realm.64 
                                                          
 60. RANDALL, supra note 13, at 58. 
 61. Durham, supra note 5, at 615. 
 62. RANDALL, supra note 13, at 71. 
 63. Id. at 28. 
 64. This is not to say that the link is a causal one: proprietorial attitudes towards 
intellectual production existed long before the Romantic period.  See id. at 65 (“It is 
commonly and not unreasonably believed that modern plagiarism is a product of the 
development of copyright laws that depend, in turn, on the rise of individualism and 
capitalism in Enlightenment Europe.  But this socio-economic model is not entirely 
satisfactory, as it does not explain . . . the almost continuous existence of plagiarism as at 
least a breach of ethics since ancient times.”).  The concept of plagiarism generally reflects a 
belief that “appropriating another’s discourse is theft,” and thus presumes that there is 
something akin to property to be thieved.  Id. at 67.  The link between Romantic concepts of 
original authorship and Enlightenment concepts of the possessive individual is therefore 
best characterized as one of mutual facilitation: one does not entail or necessitate the other, 
but each supports and complements the other.  See RICE, supra note 1, at 93 (noting that 
advocates for literary property in antebellum America were keen to enjoy the benefits 
afforded by such rights, but many were wary of the transformation of authorship that would 
come with a proprietary model and “actively resisted this categorization”); ROSE, AUTHORS 
AND OWNERS, supra note 8, at 82 (exploring the relationship between authorship and 
proprietorship); Rose, The Author as Proprietor, supra note 8, at 78 (implying that the 
traditional concern with authors’ property rights is strained by the current literary thought, 
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The valorization of original genius lent weight to claims by “authors” to 
property in their writings, and so ought not to be completely set apart from 
the proliferation of more general commercial motivations during this period 
of socio-economic change.65  Indeed, in the realm of law, the emergent 
concept of author-genius was developed strategically to further commercial 
goals, lending its ideological power to economic self-interest: 
Although the concept of “authorship” was introduced into English law 
for the functional purpose of protecting the interests of booksellers (and 
continued to do so throughout the eighteenth century and beyond), the 
term took on a life of its own as individualistic notions of creativity, 
originality, and inspiration were poured into it. “Authorship” became an 
ideology . . . . As the “authorship” construct accumulated force and 
circumstantiality, the strategic manner in which the construct initially 
had been deployed was effaced.66 
By the time the vocabulary of copyright law began embracing the term 
“authorship,” the word “author” already had acquired connotations of 
power, or “author-ity.”67  As the institution of copyright emerged in the 
eighteenth century, it thrived on the general philosophical discourse of the 
time, wherein concepts of “‘authorship’ and ‘control’ already were 
intimately associated” with the “individual” and “property,” and aspects of 
what Ian Watt has termed the “vast complex of interdependent factors 
denoted by the term ‘individualism.’”68  As Grantland Rice argued, the 
issue believed to be at stake in the literary-property debates of the time was 
“no less than one of philosophical underpinnings” of liberal thought,69 or 
what C.B. Macpherson identified as “possessive individualism.”70  In other 
                                                          
which emphasizes the idea that texts permeate and enable each other, and therefore distinct 
boundaries between separate texts are now hard to sustain). 
 65. Cf. Hesse, supra note 8, at 130-31 (arguing that in revolutionary France, political as 
well as socio-economic factors were at play in the reconception of authorship).  According 
to this argument, the idea of the individualistic author was introduced by the monarchist 
State as a means of regulating knowledge.  Id. at 130.  Revolutionary legislation propertized 
the “author’s” claim to his writing, but did so in order to ensure maximum exchange, 
recasting the notion of the “author” as a public servant as opposed to a private individual.  
Id.  Revolutionary politics and a concern for public life, led the legislators to produce “a 
legal conception of authorial identity that not only consecrated but also limited the author’s 
power of self-determination for the sake of the public good.”  Id. at 131. 
 66. Jaszi, Towards a Theory of Copyright, supra note 58, at 471. 
 67. See generally Boyle, The Search for an Author, supra note 58 (analyzing the 
“author-ity” argument dealing with Shakespeare’s works and how it relates to the theory of 
original intent by claiming that the author with “author-ity” has an opinion and facts that 
receive credibility standing alone). 
 68. Jaszi, Towards a Theory of Copyright, supra note 58, at 469 (citing IAN WATT, THE 
RISE OF THE NOVEL: STUDIES IN DEFOE, RICHARDSON AND FIELDING 60 (1957)). 
 69. RICE, supra note 1, at 89. 
 70. C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES 
TO LOCKE 3 (1962) (defining “possessive individualism” as the “conception of the 
individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to 
society for them”). 
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words, “the enlightenment project of freeing the individual from 
dependence predicated the possession of property.”71  Thus, the theme of 
Lockean and Hobbesian possessive individualism that dominated social 
thought ensured that the word “author” was invested with particular 
weight.72 
Foucault described the emergence of this notion of “author” as “the 
privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas, knowledge, 
literature, philosophy, and the sciences.”73  Through this process of 
individualization, the “author” acquired “a role quite characteristic of our 
era of industrial and bourgeois society, of individualism and private 
property.”74  The individuality and “originality” of “authorship” in its 
modern form therefore established a simple route towards individual 
ownership and the propertization of creative achievement.  The elevation of 
the “author” achieved through the notion of original genius legitimated 
writers’ claims to property in their writings, allowing a shift in the author’s 
role towards “that of a professional trading in a new form of commodity.”75  
This modern and highly individuated concept of “authorship” possesses an 
almost “alchemical power to transfer anything it can be made to adhere to 
into property, absolutely defined.”76 
The individualization of the author is both complimented and 
compounded by the propertization of the author’s product, and so the 
modern author, as an originator, became a proprietor, and his product 
became a “special kind of commodity.”77  Ownership claims flowed from 
the trope of origination as appropriation.  This connection between the 
Romantic persona of the author-as-originator and the proprietary interest 
accorded to him in his “work” is a major component of the “the solid and 
fundamental unit of the author and the work.”78  It is the conceptual unit 
                                                          
 71. RICE, supra note 1, at 89. 
 72. See MACPHERSON, supra note 70, at 269 (construing both Hobbes’s and Locke’s 
theories of possessive individualization as beginning with the individual “created in the 
image of market man” and then “mov[ing] out to society and the state”). 
 73. FOUCAULT, supra note 7, at 101. 
 74. Id. at 119; see also Jaszi, Towards a Theory of Copyright, supra note 58, at 467 
(quoting A. KERNAN, THE DEATH OF LITERATURE 123 (1990)) (“[T]he appearance in the 
eighteenth century of copyright laws and the linked artistic ideas like creativity and 
originality as a conversion of . . . ‘things of the mind into transferable articles of property . . 
. [that] has matured simultaneously with the capitalist system.’”). 
 75. Coombe, supra note 10, at 405. 
 76. Rosemary J. Coombe, Authorial Cartographies: Mapping Proprietary Borders in a 
Less-Than-Brave New World, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1357, 1358, 1361 (1996) (emphasis added) 
(arguing that the authorial “work” operates to silence the Other, struggling against “forces of 
alterity that operate as dangerous supplements to the integrity of the author/work 
relationship,” and positing that “authorial tropes” legitimize appropriation and expropriation 
at the expense of dialogic public spheres and communicational ethics). 
 77. ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS, supra note 8, at 1. 
 78. FOUCAULT, supra note 7, at 101. 
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around which copyright is built. 
Having complicated the operative assumptions of copyright’s authorship 
concept, it is appropriate to reconsider the concept of the author’s product: 
the original “work” that is the result of authorship, so defined.  The notion 
of a “work” currently enshrined in copyright law is no more inevitable than 
that of the “author” and has similarly been the subject of doctrinal 
reification or the “naturalizing” tendency of law.79  “Work,” as a term of art 
in modern copyright law, represents the commodified version of a text 
produced by the Romantic figure of the professional “author.”80  Put 
another way, the term “work” solidifies the literary property notion, 
embracing the idea of creative production as an independent, identifiable, 
and alienable object of personal property; the author’s work is an object of 
appropriation.81 
Copyright dogma thus depicts the “work” as an autonomous object with 
immutable characteristics and a fixed textual meaning: an abstraction that 
clearly facilitates its propertization as an essential adjunct to the 
individualization of the “work’s” “author.”  The idea of the “work” as a 
discrete or free-standing entity differs greatly from the understanding of 
“text” that existed from the classical period through the Renaissance, when, 
as Rose explains: “the dominant conception of literature was rhetorical.  A 
text was conceived less as an object than as an intentional act, a way of 
doing something, of accomplishing some end such as ‘teaching and 
delighting.’”82 
From the late seventeenth century to the nineteenth century and the 
Romantic period, literary creations evolved into property and commodity; 
the “text” became a “work,” an object of knowledge and meaning rather 
than a behavioral process of action and reaction.83  The propertization of 
literary creativity demanded this vision of the text as a stable object capable 
of commodification; a vision that paired easily with the Romantic 
understanding of originality and author-genius.84  Indeed, our continued 
attachment to the notion of the sole author and the solitary genius, in spite 
of the disaggregationist impulse of our postmodern age, might be regarded 
as a testament to the power of modern capitalism in which texts function as 
                                                          
 79. See Durham, supra note 5, at 614 (emphasizing that one must first identify “what is 
truly essential to authorship and the rights that flow from [a work].  A typical work of 
authorship embodies labor and personality, and society’s interest in possessing the work 
justifies the grant of exclusive rights.”). 
 80. See id. at 615; ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS, supra note 8, at 132. 
 81. See RICE, supra note 1, at 79. 
 82. Rose, The Author as Proprietor, supra note 8, at 63. 
 83. Rotstein, supra note 51, at 733-35. 
 84. See Jaszi, Towards a Theory of Copyright, supra note 58, at 479. 
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another form of private property.85 
Rice describes the debates in nineteenth century America over the 
corporeality of the literary product as reflective of “the shift in legal 
thinking from political accounts of the activity of authorship to economic 
formulations of the materiality of authorship.”86  According to Rice, the 
efforts of lobbyists to recast authorial activity as the creation of material 
capable of ownership and appropriation caused the debate over copyright to 
be “preoccupied with the object—rather than on the act of—public 
writing,” with the result that it “collapsed the intentional and 
communicative aspects of publication into an understanding of authorship 
that was no different than any other productive activity.”87  When the 
results of authorship are cast as a stable, almost corporeal entity, the 
communicative and textual nature of the work is obscured.  In the 
construction of the copyrightable work, then, the element of 
communication is sacrificed to commodification, and speech is 
mischaracterized as property (in the material and not just the relational 
sense). 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, accompanying the demise of 
the modern author-figure, the concept of the static literary work was 
increasingly questioned through the lens of structuralist and post-
structuralist thought.88  Structuralists thought the “work” to be located 
within a broader context than that of a free-standing object with 
internalized significance, as a system of signs and conventions that acquire 
meaning only through the process of assimilation by the reader.89  Post-
structuralist critique went further still, questioning the possibility of a fixed 
identity or meaning for any text, and understanding the reader and reading 
as determinative of a text whose identity must therefore be in a constant 
state of flux.90  In 1979, Barthes announced the end of the literary “work” 
as a fixed object of stable meaning to be passively consumed.91  In its place 
he proclaimed the literary “text,” an entity situated in language and 
suspended in a continual state of production in which readers are authorial 
                                                          
 85. See HOLLY A. LAIRD, WOMEN COAUTHORS 2 (2000) (noting that our impulse to 
embrace text in the realm of private property may explain our persistent commitment to the 
individualized author-figure who legitimizes the propertization of text (and not merely vice 
versa)). 
 86. RICE, supra note 1, at 91. 
 87. Id. at 91-92. 
 88. See Rotstein, supra note 51, at 735-36. 
 89. See id. at 735-36. 
 90. See id. at 736.  See generally STEPHEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES OF THE CONTEMPORARY (2d ed. 1997) (1989) (providing a 
postmodernist critique of modernism). 
 91. Roland Barthes, From Work to Text, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN 
POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 73, 74 (Josué V. Harari ed., 1979). 
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collaborators, interpretation is “intertextual,” and meanings are fluid and 
infinite.92  The boundaries between the “author” and the reader are thereby 
disintegrated as the “reader becomes an overt collaborator in an unending 
process of reading and writing . . . returning us to something very like the 
expressly collaborative writing milieu of the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance with which we began.”93 
The post-structuralist challenge to the consensus generally surrounding 
copyright’s characterization of the “work” highlights some critical fault 
lines in the assumptions of our copyright model.94  As the concept of the 
free-standing “work” is undermined by claims of “inter-textuality” and 
“audience recoding,” copyright’s “thingification” of the text becomes 
increasingly apparent and problematic.  Again, by problematizing the 
object of copyright we can create an interpretative space within which to 
rethink the nature of the “copyrightable work.”  Learning from the post-
structuralist critique, we might begin this process by relinquishing the 
notion of the “work” as a noun (a static object) and reconceptualizing 
“work” as a verb (a communicative activity). 
C. The Practical and Political Consequences for Copyright 
Post-structuralism directly challenges many of the ideas central to the 
current system of copyright by throwing into confusion the copyright 
trinity of “originality,” the “author,” and the “work.”  As a result of 
interlocking dependencies, a challenge to any one of these concepts 
disrupts the delicate balance.  To doubt any one, then, is to doubt all three; 
to dissolve the significance of one is to destabilize the foundations of 
modern copyright law.  It is possible, however, to disaggregate the current 
meaning of these concepts without effecting the disintegration of the 
                                                          
 92. See id. at 73-80. 
 93. Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 290 (1992) (discussing the reversal in the “trajectory of print” in the 
context of electronic communication and interactive hypertext, and, in particular, in relation 
to JAY DAVID BOLTER, WRITING SPACE: THE COMPUTER, HYPERTEXT, AND THE HISTORY OF 
WRITING (1991)). 
 94. See Rotstein, supra note 51, at 739-40 (positing that the radical deconstruction of 
the concept of the “work” could be incorporated into a dramatic reconfiguration of 
copyright law).  Because literary theory understands text as having an identity as a “speech 
event involving interaction among a producer (the ‘author’), the textual artifact (book, 
movie, song, computer program), and a recipient (reader, viewer, listener),” it fosters a 
copyright system that seeks to determine what is consistent about a text in a particular 
context.  Id. at 739.  An infringement action would therefore involve “a universe of 
discourse in which it is possible as a practical matter to reach agreement on the identity of 
the text such that copyright law can meaningfully adjudicate.”  Id. at 740; cf. Keith Aoki, 
Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience ‘Recoding’ Rights—Comment on Robert H. 
Rotstein, “Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work,” 68 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805, 809, 811-12 (1993) (arguing that literary theory cannot be 
assimilated into copyright law due to its exaggerated claims about the “death of the 
author”). 
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copyright system.  To achieve this requires that we re-evaluate the 
foundations and justifications of copyright as a whole, and re-imagine the 
concepts around which modern copyright law is built.  In Part II of this 
paper, I will attempt to provide a route towards this re-imagination.  In the 
remainder of Part I, my purpose is simply to underscore the political and 
practical implications of the current theoretical model.  While the issues 
addressed thus far may appear unduly abstract, it is important to stress that 
they have very real consequences for the interpretation, application, and 
operation of copyright law. 
1. The Author Function at Work 
According to Mark Rose, “[m]uch of the notorious difficulty of applying 
copyright doctrine to concrete cases can be related to the persistence of the 
discourse of original genius and to the problems inherent in the reifications 
of author and work.”95  While the aesthetic theory surrounding the 
emergence of the Romantic author-figure may sound distinctly antiquated, 
it is submitted that the fetishization of the individual and original author is 
still very much alive in our current construction of copyright and the 
policies that inform its development. 
As evolving technologies have presented new challenges for intellectual 
property policy, the authorship concept has been used to justify the 
extension of copyright’s subject matter and the scope of the protection it 
affords.  From early cases concerning the copyrightability of photographs96 
to controversies over the protection of computer software,97 the spectre of 
                                                          
 95. ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS, supra note 8, at 141. 
 96. See, e.g., Nottage v. Jackson, (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 627, 635 (U.K.) (Cotton, L.J., 
concurring) (explaining that “‘author’ involves originating, making, producing, as the 
inventive or master mind, the thing which is to be protected”).  “[T]he true definition of 
‘author’ . . . was the man who really represents or creates, or gives effect to the idea or 
fancy, or imagination.”  Id. at 637 (Bowen, L.J., concurring); see also Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884) (using this concept of “authorship” to 
grant a photographer copyright protection).  In Burrow-Giles, the Court found that the 
plaintiff made the picture “entirely from his own original mental conception . . . .  [F]rom 
[the] disposition, arrangement, or representation, made entirely by the plaintiff, he produced 
the picture in suit.”  Id. at 54-55 (emphasis added).  Therefore, the copyright was justified 
on the basis of “views of the nature of authorship and of originality, intellectual creation, 
and right to protection.”  Id. at 61. 
 97. See Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1248 (3d Cir. 
1986) (holding that copyright protection could extend to a computer program’s “structure, 
sequence and organization”).   Protection for computer programs is often justified by means 
of a comparison between the programmer and the literary “author” who imagines, inspires, 
and creates.  Id. at 1248; see also Anthony L. Clapes, Patrick Lynch & Mark R. Steinberg, 
Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Protection for Computer 
Programs, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1493, 1510-45 (1987) (outlining how a tendency toward 
limiting copyright protections does not adequately protect computer programs because, 
unlike other copyrightable forms, marketing computer programs signifies publishing); Jaszi, 
Towards a Theory of Copyright, supra note 58, at 463 n.23 (noting that the creative process 
of creating computer programs is similar to the creative process a literary author 
 226 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 15:2 
Romantic authorship has been invoked and manipulated to support the 
claims of those who stood to benefit from the monopoly rights that 
copyright could confer.98  In recent debates over peer-to-peer technologies, 
the venerated author-figure has been reinvigorated by the appeals of 
recording industry stakeholders whose “public education” and lobbying 
strategies point to the noble and deserving artist as a reason to stamp out 
online file sharing.99  In the case of the computer software debate, appeals 
to authorship tended to obscure the actual practical and policy concerns 
posed by the protection of software for this burgeoning industry and 
ultimately supported the interests of the large corporate bodies whose 
products (and profits) depended upon this putative authorship.100  Similarly, 
in the file-sharing debates, it is the corporate actors who stand to benefit 
most from the regulation and commercialization of music downloading.101  
                                                          
undertakes). 
 98. See Michael J. Madison, Comment, Where does Creativity Come From? And Other 
Stories of Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747, 757-58 (2003). 
 99. See Recording Industry Association of America, Issues – Copyright, http:// 
www.riaa.com/issues/copyright/default.asp (last visited October 29, 2006) (describing 
“copyright” in terms favorable to the artist: “You don’t need to be a lawyer to be a musician, 
but you do need to know one legal term—copyright.  To all creative artists— poets, 
painters, novelists, dancers, directors, actors, musicians, singers, and songwriters—the term 
matters dearly.  Copyright is more than a term of intellectual property law that prohibits the 
unauthorized duplication, performance or distribution of a creative work.  To artists, 
‘copyright’ means the chance to hone their craft, experiment, create, and thrive.  It is a vital 
right, and over the centuries artists, such as John Milton, William Hogarth, Mark Twain, and 
Charles Dickens, have fought to preserve that right”).  But cf. Madison, supra note 98, at 
757-58 (“Significant numbers of music consumers . . . may now be recognizing that the 
romance of the deserving Author . . . has faded, and not just because that romantic ideal 
never existed in the first place. . . . Consumers are told by copyright owners that culture has 
its price, and copyright law is the mechanism by which that price is enforced.  But 
consumers also know, more than they ever did before, that the ‘art’ that they read, watch, 
listen to, and otherwise use derives from corporate hierarchies.  The copyright industries 
have successfully commoditized culture, making what was a relatively elite industry at the 
time of copyright's inception three centuries ago into a mass and popular phenomenon.  In 
important senses, copyrighted books, records, movies, and computer programs are no 
different than mass-produced, fungible widgets.  Copyright industries should not be 
surprised to see their story [of the noble and deserving Author] take this turn, with 
consumers treating the resulting products with consumerist indifference.”). 
 100. See Pamela Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the 
Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471, 519 (1985); see 
also Jaszi, supra note 11, at 298 (describing British legal antecedents that traditionally 
award ownership to the mastermind owner of a business rather than to the workers who may 
have labored and created the product). 
 101. See David Nelson, Free the Music: Rethinking the Role of Copyright in an Age of 
Digital Distribution, 79 S. CAL. L. REV 559, 562-63 (2005) (“The music industry recently 
began a public relations campaign designed to discourage the downloading of copyrighted 
music.  An examination of the Web site established to support this effort, however, reveals 
another clear goal: convincing the public that the rights of artists and the rights of the record 
industry are one.  While this may have been true in the past, the Internet has drastically 
changed this relationship.  This connection, however, remains essential to the record 
industry.” (footnotes omitted)).  Nelson warns that “[w]hen considering the normative 
arguments for copyrights it is important to remember that in the music industry it is almost 
always the record label and not the artist that controls the copyright.”  Id. at 576. 
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The irony, of course, lies in the extent to which the Romantic notion of 
“authorship” has served the commercial interests of publishers, employers, 
and distributors, often at the expense of the people whose role in the 
“creative” process most resembled that of the Romantic author figure.102  
Indeed, the manipulation of the author concept has achieved its most 
paradoxical result in the United States in the context of works made for 
hire, where the claims of employers to direct ownership over the products 
of their employees have been rationalized in terms of a bizarre inversion of 
the “authorship” concept.103 
The persuasive force of Romantic authorship makes this an extremely 
powerful strategy for obtaining and strengthening copyright protection.  As 
such, its function in copyright discourse has altered very little since the 
occasion of its first deployment in the eighteenth century literary-property 
debates, where it was an effective ideological instrument used to cloak the 
economic interests of the booksellers.104  Indeed, as processes of creative 
production have come to resemble less and less the vision of creativity 
embodied in the Romantic author concept, the ideological function of 
“authorship” has only grown correspondingly.105 
                                                          
 102. See Jaszi, supra note 11, at 298-300 (discussing the recent upsurge of concern 
surrounding the “moral rights” of the author in Anglo-American legal doctrine, despite the 
unenthusiastic response from captains of industry); see also Jaszi, Towards a Theory of 
Copyright, supra note 58, at 496-98 (describing how granting the “moral right” of 
authorship to the person who puts in the labor of creation would detriment publishers, 
employers, and distributors by inhibiting the flow of commerce of authored works).  Jaszi 
interpreted this development as evidence of the continuing force of the Romantic authorship 
vision for its own sake, and its persistent presence in legal consciousness as a purely 
ideological concept in spite of its commercial inconvenience.  Id. at 498-99.  This may be 
even more compelling in Britain and Canada, where there has been much less reluctance to 
endorse the “moral rights” concept required by Article 6 of the 1971 Paris Act of the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.  Id. 
 103. See Jaszi, Towards a Theory of Copyright, supra note 58, at 485-90 (outlining the 
developments leading to the conception of the employer as the ideological author and 
originator, possessing the inspiration and the motivating factor in the “creation” of the 
“work,” while the employee is a mere mechanic following orders). 
 104. See id. at 500-01 (“‘[A]uthorship’ has remained what it was in eighteenth-century 
England—a stalking horse for economic interests that were (as a tactical matter) better 
concealed than revealed, and a convenient generative metaphor for legal structures that 
facilitated the emergence of new modes of production for literary and artistic works.”). 
 105. See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries 
of Intellectual Property Law, VA. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2004, at 1, 24 (suggesting that “the 
economic reality of today's intellectual property laws, perhaps best exemplified by the rise 
of corporate copyright ownership and the transfer of employee inventions to employers, 
conflicts with ‘author- or inventor-centrism’ and romantic notions of authorship,” and 
diminishes the relevance of Romantic authorship in modern copyright law).  To the 
contrary, I would suggest that the role of the Romantic author fiction grows in light of this 
economic reality.  In order to minimize the significance of Romantic authorship critiques, it 
is not enough to say that modern creativity and copyright does not in fact resemble romantic 
authorship.  At the heart of the critiques is the assertion that Romantic authorship is a fiction 
that performs a function in shaping copyright policy.  However, the function becomes more 
important as the fiction becomes more tenuous. 
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If it is true that “authorship shapes the character of copyright law,”106 our 
persistent attachment to the vision of authorship as an independent process 
of original creation must have significant implications for copyright policy.  
The presence of this vision in the legal subconscious can explain, at least in 
part, the sheer scope given to the rights of copyright owners, and the 
importance (moral, legal, and cultural) accorded to them.107  The authorship 
myth that animates copyright discourse supports calls for wide protection 
and generates complacency around the expanding domain of intellectual 
property and the corporate ownership that dominates the intellectual realm. 
2. Authors and Imitators 
Boyle argues that the myth of the Romantic author causes us to value 
some forms of “creation” over others and to underestimate the importance 
of external sources in the “creative” process, while overemphasizing the 
claims of the identified “author.”108  Specifically, this conception of 
individuated authorship privileges the person identified as the “original 
author” to the detriment of “second generation” authors making 
“downstream uses” of the original work.109 
By way of example, a clear case of this primary-author bias can be found 
in the area of “appropriation art,”110 which has its foundation in the post-
                                                          
 106. Madison, supra note 98, at 760. 
 107. See Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 873, 882-88 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: 
LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996)) (arguing that the 
Romantic Author cannot explain much about intellectual property law).  For example, 
intellectual property is “heavily skewed to protect the interests of corporations, not 
individual authors.”  Id. at 882.  However, romantic authorship may paradoxically support 
corporate ownership.  Id.  In the United States, it does this by simply recasting the 
corporation as “author.”  While in Canada, it achieves a similar result by providing a 
powerful ideological framework that overlooks the reality of corporate ownership and its 
implications for real (as opposed to mythic) authors. 
 108. See BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS, supra note 58, at 51-60. 
 109. See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1547 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the “anthologizing” of pre-existing materials by professors 
into course books for use by students was an infringement of copyright); Aoki, supra note 
94, at 815-16 (“[T]he Kinko’s court failed to focus on the substantial added social value (to 
students, professors, universities, etc.) by the serial nature of the author-like editorial 
decisions involved in tailoring, re-assembling, and distributing particular groupings of 
materials to students in a new form.  The court’s concentration on the individualized author 
model made it virtually impossible to see, let alone acknowledge the value of the 
contributions made through such modes of deviant authorship.”).  Regarding post-Modern 
appropriative art, Aoki considered the case of Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 
1992).  Id. at 813-15. 
 110. See John Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property 
Law, 3 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 105-06 (1988) (arguing for an expansion of fair use 
to permit the artistic appropriation of commercial images). See generally Johnson Okpaluba, 
Appropriation Art: Fair Use or Foul?, in DEAR IMAGES: ART, COPYRIGHT AND CULTURE 
197, 197-224 (Daniel McClean & Karsten Schubert eds., 2002) (noting that this term is used 
to refer to the practice of incorporating, without the consent of intellectual property owner, 
part or all of a protected image in the creation of a visual art work by a person other than the 
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modern aesthetic and anti-proprietary ethics.  By definition, “appropriation 
art” challenges “the viewer’s ability to see beyond the link between notions 
of originality and art’s commodity status.”111  Predictably, because 
appropriation in the production of new artistic works is prima facie 
infringement in the eyes of copyright law, artistic appropriation practices 
have clashed with a copyright regime largely incapable of accommodating 
the expressive use of reproduced images: 
[T]he incorporation of recognizable visual images into new works of  art 
. . . gives contemporary art its unique and irreverent flair.  To the law, 
appropriation is simple copyright infringement, for which only minor 
exceptions are allowed through the doctrine of fair use.  
Appropriationists have tried to avoid liability by invoking the defense of 
fair use, to little avail.  The philosophical underpinnings of post-
Modernism and intellectual property are fundamentally at odds.112 
This would explain the (in)famous Second Circuit ruling in Rogers v. 
Koons.113  In this frequently cited example, the artist Jeff Koons mounted 
his Banality show, which included the sculpture known as String of 
Puppies, depicting a couple holding a string of bright blue German 
Shepherd dogs.114  Koons based this large, three-dimensional sculpture 
upon a postcard reproduction of a black and white photograph taken by Art 
Rogers, but “undermin[ed] the sentimental cuddliness of [the original and] 
replac[ed] it with a tacky, slightly disturbing and subtly hilarious image.”115  
Koons argued that the sculpture was a satire of society at large and 
belonged to an artistic tradition that critiqued modern consumer culture 
through the incorporation of objects and media images drawn from 
contemporary, mass-produced culture.116  Nonetheless, Rogers succeeded 
in his copyright infringement suit against Koons, whose work was regarded 
by the court to be intentionally exploitative, lacking in parodic value, and 
beyond the scope of fair use.117 The decision has been criticized as “rife 
with ominous implications for the practice of artistic appropriation,”118 and 
the court has been criticized for basing its decision upon “its distaste for 
                                                          
owner).  Relevant artistic practices include collage, montage, and simulation. Id. 
 111. See Okpaluba, supra note 110, at 201. 
 112. Heather J. Meeker, The Ineluctable Modality of the Visible: Fair Use and Fine Arts 
in the Post-Modern Era, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 195, 195 (1993). 
 113. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 114. Id. at 304-05. 
 115. KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: OVERZEALOUS COPYRIGHT BOZOS 
AND OTHER ENEMIES OF CREATIVITY 141 (2005). 
 116. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309. 
 117. Id. at 309-10. 
 118. Martha Buskirk, Appropriation Under the Gun, ART IN AMERICA, June 1992, at 37. 
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Koons and his art [rather] than . . . any sound legal principle.”119 
Rogers v. Koons offers a concrete example of the troublesome nature of 
author-based reasoning and, for this reason, it has received plenty of 
attention in copyright scholarship.120  According to Keith Aoki, for 
example, the court’s conclusion resulted from the polarization of the parties 
in light of a particular vision of worthy authorship: the “‘pure’ artist” was 
contrasted with the “conniving and cynical art world rook;” the plaintiff’s 
“solo production” was contrasted with the defendant’s team of “skilled 
laborers;” and “photo from life” was contrasted with “parodistic treatment 
of pre-existing cultural material.”121  These polarizations converged to 
undermine the cultural and artistic contribution made by Koons’s 
product.122  The court could not regard Rogers’s work as a legitimate 
source of others’ creativity because Rogers “was so clearly an author,” and 
his photograph so clearly an original copyrightable work.123  Similarly, the 
court could not regard Koons as an author or creator of meaning because he 
failed to fit the template of an original author who creates independently.124  
Viewed from this perspective, the case reveals “copyright’s bias toward 
rewarding clearly demarcated individual authorship with property rights 
enfroceable [sic] against later deviant authors who attempt to trespass 
without ‘author-ization’ on those rights.”125 
The problem highlighted here is the power of the individual authorship 
trope to occlude discussion of the social, educational, or cultural value of 
downstream or derivative uses of protected works.126  Because copyright’s 
concept of the work resides in independent, original production, the work 
of a second-generation producer cannot compete equally as a “work” of 
social value that merits protection; the social importance or the cultural 
value of the second text barely comes within the cognizance of the law.127  
                                                          
 119. Okpaluba, supra note 110, at 207. 
 120. See Aoki, supra note 94, at 813-15; see also Jaszi, supra note 11, at 305-12 
(pointing out how Judge Cardamone adopted value-laden descriptions that disparage 
Koons’s use of the “Puppies” image by characterizing Rogers’s enterprise as creative and 
Koons’s as opportunistic). 
 121. Aoki, supra note 94, at 813-14. 
 122. Id. at 814 (“By thus casting the dichotomies between the works or texts produced 
by Art Rogers, earnest artist/photographer, and Jeff Koons, cynical postmodernist sculptor, 
the judicial calculus was freighted to come out in Rogers' [sic] favor on the question of 
substantial similarity and to reject Koons' [sic] puntative fair use defense to infringement 
liability on the grounds of parody.”). 
 123. Id. at 814-15. 
 124. Id. at 815. 
 125. Id. at 814. 
 126. See Rotstein, supra note 51, at 794 (concluding that “the construct of the ‘work’—
the reification of the text—provides a built-in bias toward the plaintiff’s work” that does not 
permit useful appropriation). 
 127. But see Aoki, supra note 94, at 824-25 (“Radically expanding the concept of 
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Add to this the subconscious and rhetorical impact of copyright’s author 
construct: the idealization of the author-originator entails the corresponding 
denigration of the author-user.  Rather than regarding downstream users as 
authors who use prior texts to make new and important contributions to 
social dialogue, these authors are reduced to copiers from whom genuine 
authors must be protected.128  As a result of its commitment to fictional 
notions of “creation” and “creator,” copyright fails to adequately appreciate 
alternative methods or actors.  When they fall on the wrong side of the 
creator-imitator dichotomy, they are infringers, not worthy authors. 
In contemporary culture there are many forms of art, music, and 
intellectual endeavor that draw directly, consciously, and explicitly from 
pre-existing and protected works129 (a practice that differs from other 
traditional forms of cultural “creativity” only in the sense that such 
derivation is typically indirect, unconscious, or implicit).  It is crucial to 
understand that even as creators consume and re-present existing images 
and text, they are engaged in their own act of meaning making.130  In a 
                                                          
authorship by accounting and arguing for legal acknowledgement of a wider range of 
alternate authorship possibilities works to break up the image of the individuated Romantic 
author, opening up the possibility that a chastened copyright regime may then be able to 
reconceive of texts as fluid events, with dynamic inputs coming in, feeding back and 
intersecting at multiple loci.”). 
 128. See Rotstein, supra note 51, at 795 (reasoning that it is therefore perfectly palatable 
to impose liability upon them). 
 129. See MCLEOD, supra note 115, at 30, 68 (using digital sampling in rap and hip-hop 
music as an obvious example, although musical borrowing has a long history in the jazz and 
blues tradition).  “The things that DJ Derrida, Funkmaster Foucault and Roland 808 Barthes 
wrote about in the late 1960s and 1970s foreshadowed, in part, the way today’s young adults 
have been brought up reading and playing with fragmented, hyperlinked texts and images. 
The manner in which [they] use the Internet and editing software has severely damaged the 
myth of the individual genius author, for it gives them the tools to freely collage image, 
music, and text.” Id. at 73.  The recent controversy surrounding the Grey Album, by 
underground hip-hop artist Danger Mouse, an album that combined instrumental fragments 
from the Beatles’ White Album with a capella rap vocals by Jay-Z, reflects this new reality.  
Id. at 153-54.  As Danger Mouse explained in an MTV interview, “I thought it would be 
more challenging and more fun and more of a statement on what you could do with 
sampling alone. . . . It is an art form.  It is music.  You can do different things, it doesn’t 
have to be just what some people call stealing.”  Id. at 153.  See generally LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN 
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004) (discussing how new technologies such as the 
digital sampler and online file sharing have expanded the creative possibilities of re-mixing 
pre-existing works and cultural artefacts); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip 
Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 580 (2006) 
(illustrating the prevalence of courts’ negative characterization of hip-hop borrowing and 
sampling as theft). 
 130. See Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual 
Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1863 (1991) (arguing “that 
the consumption of commodified representational forms is productive activity in which 
people engage in meaning-making to adapt signs, texts, and images to their own agendas,” 
not just an appropriative activity). But see also Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How the 
Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 
(2004) (warning that the rhetoric of transformative appropriation should not be used to 
evoke yet another creative genius and thereby devalue pure copying, which is also 
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process of cultural dialogue, this re-presentation is a response to what has 
already been said: appropriation is therefore a “technique in critical 
discourse.”131  Indeed, the very act of appropriation can be politically 
symbolic to the extent that it openly resists proprietary structures and 
“manifests a rejection of private property in favor of a more communitarian 
conception of society.”132  If the communicative function of authorship 
were not lost beneath the commodified object of copyright, the significance 
of appropriation as communication would be evident, and the value of its 
contribution to cultural dialogue could be appreciated. 
However, this is a message that copyright in its current form seems 
unable to absorb without thereby signalling its own demise.  With respect 
to the legal commentators who critique Koons, Marilyn Randall insists: 
“There is an unwitting irony in the suggestion that the institution 
specifically charged with the regulation of private-property rights 
according to financial incentives, should embrace a critique of those very 
rights and incentives to the point of ‘legalizing’ those infractions that it is 
constituted to control.”133  The apparent irony dissipates if we replace the 
idea of copyright as the regulation of private-property rights with the idea 
of copyright as a vehicle to encourage the creation of meaning and 
widespread engagement in social discourse.  From this perspective the real 
unwitting irony would be that an institution entrusted with this public 
purpose should foreclose the very meaning-making it is supposed to 
encourage.  If copyright cannot reflect the realities of cultural creation, then 
cultural creation may be forced to reflect the realities of copyright, to the 
detriment of us all.134 
D. Conclusions on Copyright’s Authorship Construct 
Our copyright regime is presently “in the thrall of an idea [of authorship] 
that is taken as truth where it should be questioned as dogma.”135  The 
                                                          
expression). See generally Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005) (developing the idea of the “situated user” as opposed to the 
“romantic user”). 
 131. Patricia A. Kreig, Note, Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 
1565, 1578 (1984). 
 132. Id. at 1578-79 (“[T]he act of appropriation itself imparts a political message; it 
reveals that society (and its legal system) is laden with assumptions that financial incentives 
promote individual creativity, and that property interests supersede society’s right of access 
to ideas and information.” (footnote omitted)). 
 133. RANDALL, supra note 13, at 258. 
 134. Arewa, supra note 129, at 645 (“Such notions of music creation are often not 
conducive to the development of vibrant and living music traditions.  As we apply such 
legal standards, we should be careful and be alert to the . . . fact that musical production may 
in the end come to mirror the conceptions contained in the copyright standards applied to 
it.”). 
 135. James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, 
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discussion in Part I has suggested the need for a radical demystification of 
the “work” concept and the notions of “originality” and the “author” that 
dominate copyright rhetoric but prove inhospitable to the public purposes 
of the copyright system.  The societal function of copyright is to encourage 
participation in cultural dialogue.  Where the author is a worthy producer of 
something from nothing and the work is an owned object of fixed meaning, 
the dialogic and communicative nature of cultural creativity is hidden from 
view.  The result is a copyright regime which propertizes and over-protects 
the works of some authors while dismissing others as copiers and 
trespassers; which encourages some kinds of creativity while condemning 
others as unlawful appropriation; which values so-called original 
contributions but silences responses in the cultural conversation.  Rather 
than creating an environment for communication and facilitating an 
exchange of meaning, the system creates a marketplace for intellectual 
products and rules for the exchange of commodities.  By recognizing these 
central tenets of copyright doctrine—authorship, originality, and the 
work—as politically, socially, and legally constructed metaphors lacking 
any essential meaning, it may be possible to reconsider their role and 
substance in a way that allows them to better serve their function in the 
furtherance of copyright’s public purposes. 
II. AUTHORSHIP AND CONCEPTIONS OF THE SELF: A FEMINIST INQUIRY 
INTO THE PROCESSES OF CREATIVITY 
A. Introducing Feminist Theory 
In Part I, I suggested that copyright law and its construction of 
authorship are premised upon the assumptions (both ontological and 
normative) of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment era, and in 
particular, the tenets of possessive individualism.  The result is a copyright 
model that forces all intellectual production into doctrinal categories 
shaped by individualistic assumptions about the authorial ideal, producing 
the simplifying dichotomies of creation/reproduction, author/user, 
laborer/free-rider.  Unless we problematize these binary oppositions, we 
risk hindering and preventing precisely the kinds of communicative 
activities that copyright is meant to encourage.  I have suggested that, in 
order for copyright to embrace marginalized forms of creativity (especially 
those that explicitly rely upon prior works for their expression), we need to 
achieve a theoretical shift away from the liberal model upon which it is 
currently built. 
In Part II, I will argue that the legitimacy and success of copyright law 
                                                          
and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1534 (1992). 
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depends upon a theoretical framework informed by feminist theory and 
capable of embracing the notion of the relational self/author and the 
principles of dialogism.  Identifying the liberalist foundations of the 
intellectual property system therefore opens a door for the re-imagination 
of copyright.  Based as it is upon the legal structures and theoretical 
assumptions of liberal thought, the copyright model embraces liberal 
notions of the “self”: copyright’s “author” is liberalism’s human subject.  It 
follows that the impoverished subject of liberal thought entails an 
impoverished vision of the author.  I hope to show that an ontological self 
that is complicated by liberalism’s feminist critics can provide a route by 
which to see authorship in all its complexity. 
My purpose in exploring the weaknesses of copyright’s author-figure is 
not to proclaim the death of the original author.  Copyright needs the author 
(just as feminism needs the equal and autonomous bearer of rights).  
Rather, the question is “how can we [re]conceptualize authorship as a 
largely transformative act . . . without losing our sense of . . . how to 
distinguish . . . between the original and unoriginal, or ‘authored’ and ‘un-
authored’?”136  It is in the face of this dilemma that I turn to feminist 
theory.  Employing the notions of dialogism and the relational self that 
have emerged from feminist scholarship, I hope to show how we can re-
imagine the author not as source, origin, or authority, but rather as 
participant and citizen.  We can re-imagine authorship as the formation of 
individual identity and the development of self and community through 
discourse.  These ideas illuminate the nature of authorship as a social and 
formative process, but they also offer the foundation for a coherent 
justification of copyright.  If speech/dialogue makes us social beings, 
copyright law, which aims to encourage creativity and exchange, thereby 
encourages meaningful relations of communication and participation with 
others.  We have to comprehend the substance of copyright’s ends before 
we can expect it to achieve them. 
In the discussion that follows, I will explore the challenges faced by 
feminists in defining the nature of the “subject” in literary and political 
theory, and some of the ways in which feminist scholarship has met these 
challenges.  In doing so, my ultimate aim is to import some of the concepts 
and reasoning that has proved central to feminist theorizing into debates 
about the reconstruction of authorship.  In Section B, I will briefly 
highlight the convergences I see between feminist theory, constructions of 
                                                          
 136. Durham, supra note 52, at 72 (emphasis added); see also Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, 
Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 121, 153 (Lucie Guibault & P. 
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authorship, and conceptions of selfhood.  In Section C, I will outline the 
dilemmas presented by competing constructions of authorship and suggest 
a possible route towards meeting these challenges with an appeal to 
“dialogic feminism.”  I will then consider, in Section D, the similar 
challenges faced by feminists in light of competing conceptualizations of 
selfhood.  I will appeal to relational feminism, and the attendant concept of 
dialogue, as appropriate vehicles by which to resolve the debates and 
collapse the dichotomies that have characterized much of contemporary 
political theorizing about the nature of the self.  In Section E, I will inquire 
into the potential for these feminist discourses to reshape our understanding 
of the processes and products of cultural creativity, and the nature of the 
rights granted by the copyright system. 
B. Feminism, Authorship, and Constructions of the Self 
The paragon of independent original creation, discussed in Part I, 
represents a naïve conception of the processes of authorship, and so 
provides the copyright system with an untenable—and undesirable— 
premise.  To the extent that the truly original author-owner is 
conceptualized as an individual (and not merely a function or fiction), she 
depends upon Enlightenment ideals of individuation, detachment, 
segmentation, and abstraction.137  The competing view sees the author as 
necessarily engaged in a process of adaptation, derivation, translation and 
recombination.138  This latter version of authorship coheres with a view of 
the individual as socially situated, as constituted by community, culture, 
and society, thus constantly shifting and evolving: “a ‘subject in process’—
never unitary, never complete.”139  Rather than meaning created out of 
nothing, the author’s expression is the result of the complex variety of 
influences that have shaped her, and its meaning is essentially fluid, 
derived only from its interaction with other texts and discourses. 
The tension between competing constructions of authorship has played 
out in feminist literary theory as a debate between recovering a strong and 
stable identity for women writers and their experiences and deconstructing 
traditional notions of author and experience.140  This tension in literary 
theory to some extent mirrors a tension that has been a critical subject of 
feminist scholarship in political and social theory: the tension between the 
individual, pre-social self of liberal theory and the socially constituted, 
                                                          
 137. See Thomas D. Barton, Troublesome Connections: The Law and Post-
Enlightenment Culture, 47 EMORY L.J. 163, 168-90 (1998). 
 138. BARBARA L. MARSHALL, ENGENDERING MODERNITY: FEMINISM, SOCIAL THEORY 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 108 (1994). 
 139. Id. 
 140. LAURIE A. FINKE, FEMINIST THEORY, WOMEN’S WRITING 1 (1992). 
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always-already encumbered self instated in communitarian critiques of 
liberalism.  While these debates have generally been insulated from one 
another as a result of disciplinary divides, they are not unrelated and 
present similar challenges for feminism.  Namely, how can we escape a 
concept of the self that ignores relations, discourses, and communities, 
without descending into a position where subjectivity and agency is 
overwhelmed by social situation? 
The egalitarian rhetoric of feminist politics and its foundation in rights 
discourse weds feminism to the central premises of modernist theory.141  
However, the historic exclusion of women from the benefits of rights and 
egalitarianism reveals as fictive the neutrality of modernism’s 
philosophical paradigm and casts doubt upon the universalism of its 
putative meta-narratives.142  Arguments about the nature of social theory’s 
“subject,” and challenges to the liberal conception of the self in particular, 
have thus played a central role in the feminist struggle for genuine and 
substantive equality.  Western liberal philosophy conceives of the self as an 
autonomous (independent) rational agent with the capacity for self-
determination.  This conception entails claims about the rights the agent 
must have if he is to be free to exercise this capacity: in particular, the right 
to own private property and to enter into voluntary, private contractual 
relations with other autonomous agents.143  As it is currently conceived, 
copyright, which takes the form of a private property right and is premised 
upon transferability through contract in a free market, relies squarely upon 
this liberal notion of the self as independent creator, individual owner, and 
rational (economic) agent.144  It has been widely argued that liberalism’s 
version of the self cannot accommodate—and so excludes or silences—
those people whose experienced realities do not resonate with the 
individualized account of autonomy.  Similarly, copyright’s version of the 
author cannot accommodate—and so excludes or silences—those people 
whose communicative activities do not fit within the individualized and 
originative account of authorship. 
However, the simple refusal of a “subject” is highly problematic for the 
                                                          
 141. Jennifer Nedelsky, Citizenship and Relational Feminism, in CANADIAN POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: CONTEMPORARY REFLECTIONS 131, 134-35 (Ronald Beiner & Wayne Norman 
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feminist political project,145 just as the simple refusal of the “author” would 
be highly problematic for copyright policy.  It is not sufficient for feminist 
theory to radically deconstruct the modernist self because with the 
evaporation of the self comes the evaporation of the concept of woman.146  
Feminists in literary, political, and legal theory alike have therefore 
struggled to find a conception of the self that acknowledges connectivity 
without precluding individual autonomy, identity, or voice.  This struggle 
stems from awareness of the feminist ontological dilemma. “[I]t can fully 
embrace neither an unreconstructed modernism’s ‘subject’ nor 
postmodernism’s rejection of the subject.”147 
It has thus been observed that feminism “constitutes both a critique of 
and a defen[s]e of modernity, so has a great stake in the modernity-
postmodernity debates, which are at heart about the possibility of a 
‘subject’ for social theory.”148  In other words, “the issue of agency and of 
subjectivity more generally . . . lies at the heart of feminism’s ambiguous 
‘positioning’ between modernity and post-modernity.”149  Issues of agency 
and subjectivity are also critical to the construction of the author in 
copyright law: if we are to tackle the unreconstructed notion of the author 
as independent creator, but also refuse to deconstruct the author out of 
existence, then copyright theory has a similar stake in the modernity-
postmodernity debates, which pertain to the possibility of an author-subject 
for the copyright system. 
The re-imagination of copyright requires a challenge to the concept of 
autonomous selfhood that informs liberal political theory.  It also requires a 
concept of self that affirms the centrality of relationships and community 
while acknowledging creative capacity and the agency to engage in social 
discourses.  It seems to follow that feminist theory can inform copyright’s 
search for an author-subject because it offers not only a critique of the 
atomized liberal individual, but its reconstitution as a rights-bearing, 
autonomous, and relational self.  It therefore holds the promise of a new 
theoretical model that can be brought to bear on the copyright system. 
                                                          
 145. See MARSHALL, supra note 138, at 111. 
 146. See Teresa de Lauretis, Upping the Anti [sic] in Feminist Theory, in THE CULTURAL 
STUDIES READER 74, 83 (Simon During ed., photo. reprint, Routledge 1997) (1993). 
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 149. BROOKS, supra note 148, at 15. 
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C. Feminist Literary Criticism and the Author-Self 
1. The Dilemma for Feminist Literary Theory 
Foucault began his examination of the relationship between the text and 
the author by posing the question, “What does it matter who is 
speaking?”150  Since the “fundamental unit of the author and the work” 
gives rise to the “fundamental category of ‘the-man-and-his-work 
criticism,’”151 a feminist might answer that it matters precisely because the 
authoritative speaker is presumed to be a man.  It certainly is arguable that, 
where authors belong to traditionally marginalized or unauthorized groups, 
the poststructuralist effacement of the author only compounds the historic 
invisibility of these stifled voices and denies them the authority to speak 
that traditionally attaches to authorship152 before it has even been 
acknowledged. Nancy K. Miller responds to Foucault’s question: 
What matter who’s speaking?  I would answer that it matters, for 
example, to women who have lost and still routinely lose their proper 
name in marriage, and whose signature—not merely their voice—has not 
been worth the paper it was written on; women for whom the signature–
by virtue of its power in the world of circulation—is not immaterial.  
Only those who have it can play with not having it.153 
Miller’s statement captures the feminist concern that the fragmentation 
of the author and her work forecloses the inquiry into the agency of the 
female subject, reduces her self-expression to a textual construction, and 
thereby reasserts hegemonic masculine meaning-making in the guise of 
intertextuality.154  According to Miller, where the author dissipates into 
textual free-play, there can be no acknowledgement of the author qua 
woman; disaggregating the author is therefore a luxury that belongs to 
those whose identities are not already experienced as decentered and 
fragmented.155 
Marilyn Randall defined authorship as “the attribution of a particular set 
                                                          
 150. FOUCAULT, supra note 7, at 101. 
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 152. RANDALL, supra note 13, at 58-59. 
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of authorial functions to the agent of discourse.”156  This definition reveals, 
first, the agency implicit in the concept of authorship (a comparatively 
transhistorical constant), and, second, the need to inquire into the nature 
and operation of these authorial functions (as fluid and historical 
contingencies).157  Randall identifies one relatively stable feature or 
function of authorship as the notion of the appropriation of the authority-to-
speak.158  Feminist and post-colonial theorists have exposed the 
presupposition of such authority in their examinations of marginalized 
discourses, which reveal “authorship” to be “a privilege that must be 
acquired (constructed, earned, or appropriated), even in the postmodern, 
‘post-authorial’ context.”159  Furthermore, the notion of the “appropriation” 
or “misappropriation” of “voice” across “communities of identity,” which 
is premised upon a concern with the “authenticity” of the speaker’s voice, 
has been a common component of contemporary gender, racial, and post-
colonial literary studies.160 
This presents a dilemma for critical theorists, pitting the “authorizing 
authenticity of personal experience against the dangers of the essentialism 
that authority based on gender, race, or culture and sexuality seem to 
imply.”161  It also suggests the root of a divide that emerged in the feminist 
literary criticism of the 1980s “between those pragmatically committed to 
the recovery of the woman writer and, with her, something usually called 
women’s experience, and those concerned to explore the implications for 
feminism of postmodern theories that question the legitimacy of such 
constructs as the author and experience.”162 
The poststructuralist critiques of copyright’s “author” and “work,” 
outlined in Part I, clearly encapsulate this feminist dilemma.  I have argued 
that copyright theory has to complicate the author construct if it is to 
recognize the realities of cultural creativity.  However, in the context of 
women’s writing, and from the perspective of literary theory’s 
“gynocritics,”163 such a challenge to the author is a challenge to the 
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assertion of women’s experience and the project of recovering women’s 
voices.  More fundamentally, it is a challenge to the male voice and the 
paternal nature of authorship that characterized Romantic and post-
Romantic aesthetics, for “[t]he image of the ‘artist’ underlying the words of 
the Copyright Act is that of the solitary male genius, isolated both spatially 
and temporally from his community and the background of the art in which 
he works.”164  In other words, society should not be fooled into assuming 
that the original author-figure of copyright (and the target of 
poststructuralist critique) is gender-neutral. 
Also, the gendered nature of the authorial ideal is evident in the aesthetic 
and cultural theories of value that determine the worth or import of 
intellectual contributions.165  In this regard, feminists have pointed to the 
exclusionary category of the literary canon that attributes greatness to 
predominantly (white, first-world) male authors.166  The equalizing solution 
initially proposed was simply the discovery, re-evaluation, and inclusion of 
worthy women writers who met accepted standards of excellence.167  The 
better solution, I think, is to challenge the traditional theories of value 
represented by the canon and to “interrogate the processes through which 
such values are produced, given authority, and disseminated within a 
particular historical and social formation,” and the manner in which they 
“reproduce the social formation that created them.”168  One might ask, for 
example, why traditional aesthetic values favor originality over creative 
imitation, or sole authorship over collaborative creativity, and how these 
preferences emulate and perpetuate the solitary male authorial ideal.  How 
is it that such contingent and contestable value judgments have come to 
seem “natural, timeless, and self-evident,”169 and whose experienced 
realities or aspirations do they reflect?  Examined in this light, it is not 
surprising that the relationship between the author and the work as 
concretized in copyright law should reflect “a paternalistic or patriarchal 
relationship in that it emphasizes the importance of identifying the 
particular author responsible for creating a work and gives to him the 
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absolute right to control and exploit the work for economic gain.”170 
As feminists have learned, it is often a misguided strategy to attempt to 
fit women into patriarchal structures by showing the ways in which we are 
the same and so deserve to be included.171  The better approach is to 
challenge the structure itself and the putative universalizability of the 
attributes and values it represents.172  If we chose simply to assert the 
women writer as equally authentic, authoritative, and original, we should 
be aware that this project presupposes “a concept of stable identity and an 
authenticity and originality rooted in an ontological ‘self.’”173  In this 
respect, I share Finke’s concern: 
[I]t has been the project of feminism to enable women to construct the 
same powerful sense of identity as men.  But the search for ‘authentic’ 
women’s experience, for the woman writer who expresses herself 
authentically, grounds the female ‘self’ in a Western mind/body dualism 
that ironically reinforces the very ideology of bourgeois individualism 
feminists wish to resist.174 
Similarly, there is a danger that, by insisting upon the inclusion of 
certain women writers in the canon, we only subsume new works within 
the traditional definitions175 while continuing to portray value as inherent 
and objective rather than contingent and perspectival.176  Instead, we must 
cast doubt upon the ideological assumptions that have shaped conceptions 
of authorship and question the attributes by which the value of literary 
achievement has been measured.177  Mary O’Connor explains this need to 
re-evaluate rather than integrate: 
Women’s literature has been motivated by the imperative to know who 
we are and how to act on that knowledge, but our liberation comes 
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belatedly as we discover that the ‘wholeness’ of men is indeed a 
fabrication . . . . Freedom in this poststructuralist world must come from 
analyzing and subverting all constructed identities . . . . Women must 
still deconstruct the patriarchal image of ourselves as silent, . . . but 
problems arise when we start to construct our own identity. 
These issues have been debated in feminist literary theory—whether it is 
our job to establish a new identity, unified and strong, based on personal 
experience that is not dependent on male dominance, or to forego this 
Romantic illusion and look for an identity that is based on the fluid 
process of history.178 
Undoubtedly, this presents a challenging dilemma for feminist 
theorizing.  How can we resist the dominant (male) Romantic author-
figure, while refusing to let go of the empowerment that the author-
function affords?  How can we reject the entirely fragmented, “deceased” 
author of radical poststructuralism, which forecloses discussion about 
subjectivity and the agency/identity of the author-subject, while insisting 
upon the deconstruction of the author-label?  How can we claim to value 
particular works of authorship, while repudiating the traditional criteria by 
which works have been evaluated and disavowing the concept of inherent 
or internal value? 
2. Introducing Dialogism 
These challenges present themselves as binary oppositions, asking us to 
choose between biographical author-person and historical author-function; 
between a stable pre-existing self and a “radically decentered and 
fragmented subject;”179 between universal value systems and an aesthetic 
relativism that precludes value judgments.180  A feminist literary theory 
needs to dissolve these dichotomies if it is to arrive at a concept of 
authorship capable of acknowledging the identity of the author, her 
subjectivity, and the value of her contribution.  According to Finke and 
O’Connor, the notion of dialogism, drawn from the work of Mikhail 
Bakhtin181 (and ostensibly reworked to overcome the male-centeredness of 
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Bakhtin’s critique),182 is capable of bridging these poles and offering a 
space within which to contest them.183 
While a comprehensive or critical account of Bakhtin’s dialogic theory is 
beyond the scope of this work, it is important to highlight the central 
characteristics of Bakhtinian dialogism that have been harnessed by 
feminist critics in the face of these challenges.  The appeal to dialogism has 
provided a critical rhetoric with which feminists have sought to empower 
suppressed voices and discourses, while revealing the otherness hidden 
within dominant, ostensibly monologic discourse.184  In particular, Finke 
draws upon Bakhtin’s portrayal of discourse as inherently dialogic and 
multivocal: every utterance exists in relation to other utterances, with the 
result that all utterances must be understood as interactive and inter-
animating.185  Every utterance contains within it myriad voices 
(heteroglossia)186 that stand in dialogic relationship with one another: a 
notion that emancipates subordinated voices while discrediting formalistic, 
ahistorical analyses of language and literature.187  For Bakhtin, language is 
always a struggle between “competing codes, interpretations, and 
reconstructions of meaning,”188 and literature is only the magnification of 
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that struggle.189  Language (and so literature) therefore exists in the “realm 
of cultural activity, where it participates in the historical, social, and 
political life of its speakers... as both a production and a producer of social 
relations.”190 
The concept of dialogism captures the clash and struggle of different 
languages and allows us to see the social significance of discourse and the 
relational nature of every utterance.191  Bakhtin’s theory offers a critique of 
the transcendental self by attributing to the speaker a sociolinguistic point 
of view and arming him only with a language already saturated with the 
voices of others.192  However, it also promises the power and agency to 
actively respond to the dominant discourses, and “the opportunity to 
engage in a productive, complex exchange with the other’s words.”193  
Hence, the attraction of Bakhtin’s theory for feminist critics: 
[Bakhtin’s] dialogism . . . takes into account the various determining and 
producing historical factors in our lives and at the same time allows for 
the idea of an active response on the part of the subject to these various 
discourses and other subject positions.  Thus, his theories allow for a 
model of intersecting ideologies, in other words, a connection with 
history in society, as well as a model of connecting with others.  Finally, 
they allow for process and change.194 
3. Dialogism, Authorship, and Copyright 
Furnished with the concept of the dialogic, we can return to some of the 
dilemmas that have challenged feminist literary criticism.  The desire to 
hold onto a concept of authorship—and the accompanying notions of 
authority, authenticity, and identity—had caused some feminists to resist 
the “death of the author,” or the Foucauldian insinuation that it may not 
matter who speaks.195  Finke notes, however, that Foucault did not go so far 
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as to state that the speaker’s identity does not matter; rather, he invited us 
to consider whether it matters, and if so, why.196  Finke finds an answer in 
Foucault’s work and expresses it in terms that seem to draw together 
Foucault’s skepticism of the author-figure and Bahktin’s optimistic 
dialogism: 
It matters [who is speaking], but for different reasons from those we 
have in the past supposed: not because a fixed, preexisting self expresses 
itself through discourse but because discourses—historically situated 
discourses—are part of the evolving, open-ended, and shifting process of 
becoming a subject.197 
It follows, for Finke, that “[t]he contemporary theoretical concern with 
destabilizing subjectivity must be theorized relationally and historically 
rather than categorically.”198  The binary opposition between the wholly 
unified and the irretrievably fragmented author can be dissolved when we 
recognize the author-subject as existing at the “nexus of material, social, 
and historical practices through which [her] subjectivity . . . has been 
constructed.”199 Historically situated discourses shape the author’s 
subjectivity, while the author shapes those discourses by contributing her 
voice to the dialogue.  That the contribution is “hers” matters, not because 
she is the authoritative source of meaning, but because “language cannot be 
cut loose from person, time, and place to float freely in some ideal, 
impersonal, non-time, non-space.”200  By adding her voice to the dialogue, 
the speaker qua author engages in the complex arena of struggle and 
exchange with other dynamic voices and discourses in the cultural realm: a 
discursive interplay which operates at the levels of the text, society, and the 
self. 
If subjectivity does not transcend history, neither does the author.  The 
author necessarily writes from within a “complex network of . . . social 
relations that fracture the author’s apparent solidity as the locus of meaning 
in her texts.”201  A dialogic account of the author therefore repudiates the 
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notion of the highly individualized or atomized self, but it also 
acknowledges the discursive agency of the author (albeit within the 
constrictions of inherited social discourses).  While the subjectivity is 
constituted through discourses, it is also contested within discourses.202  
From this perspective, the historical and situational contingency of the 
author-as-subject category does not detract from the agency of the author-
as-speaker, nor does it undermine the significance of the author’s 
discourse.  The author is socially situated and necessarily dependent upon 
the texts, languages, and discourses already at play in the cultural domain.  
However, because the utterance is always imbued with the particular 
situation of the speaker and the addressee, its significance is always critical, 
interactive, and novel.  The embedded nature of the author-self does not 
preclude originality, but rather affirms it.  “It is the context, a particular 
social and cultural situation, that creates the sign’s provisional, local 
meaning.”203  This is not originality in its conventional sense, but a 
complex notion of originality whose significance is not rooted in the 
independence of the author and text. 
This understanding of the author implies a concomitant revision of the 
concept of authorship: authorship is about interacting with the meanings 
and texts and discourses that are already out there—already shaping our 
ideologies, communities, and ourselves—and adding to them something of 
ourselves and our (socially-constituted) subjectivity.  Others’ speech is 
always present in our own, but this reality does not stultify our attempts to 
create meaning.  “[W]e can take it into new contexts, attach it to new 
material, put it in a new situation in order to wrest new answers from it, 
new insights into its meaning, and even wrest from it new words of our 
own (since another’s discourse, if productive, gives birth to a new word 
from us in response).”204  The dialogic approach thus casts authorship as 
something very different than the Romantic ideal that flows from a socially 
dislocated account of the author-self: authorship is not originative but 
participative; it is not internal but interactive; it is not independent but 
interdependent.  In short, a dialogic account of authorship is equipped to 
appreciate the derivative, collaborative, and communicative nature of 
authorial activity in a way that the Romantic account never can. 
At another level, this dialogic theory of authorship can also assist with 
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the feminist interrogation into the theories of value that have defined the 
worthy attributes of intellectual works.205  Value judgments themselves are 
revealed to be utterances existing in dialogic relationship with other 
judgments, meaning that value is not intrinsic to the text or self-evident, but 
is contingent and so dependent upon external ideals and agendas.206  This 
acknowledgement should lead us to inquire into alternative discourses 
cloaked behind the monologic claims of the dominant discourse.  We could 
ask, for example, whether originality merits its centrality in the valuation of 
literary works, and what dialogical response this statement of value 
anticipates.  Who might argue that value resides in originality, in what 
conditions, and to what end?  Who might disagree, and what circumstances 
or purposes would cause them to do so?207  While a dialogic approach 
reveals the importance of agency, function, and condition in theories of 
value,208 these dynamic concepts are hidden behind the abstract 
universalism of copyright’s author-figure, and the intrinsic value of 
copyright’s original intellectual work.  Dialogism forces copyright theory 
to address the contingent nature of its assumptions about the copyrightable 
work and the discourses it privileges. 
Where a property-rights oriented account of copyright fails to capture the 
nature of copyright as speech regulation, a focus on the dialogic illuminates 
the institutional role that copyright plays in shaping discourses.  As Finke 
explains: 
[E]very utterance about value forms part of a discourse on value, 
forming a class of judgments, a speech genre governed by rules that 
determine the authority (or lack thereof) of the speaker or the receiver 
and the particular historical, social, or institutional context in which an 
utterance is given force.209 
The copyright system is an institution that attributes value to particular 
utterances, and thereby determines the authority of the speaker (author), as 
well as the lack of authority of the receiver (user).  The dialogic approach 
provides a lens through which to view the influence of copyright in 
structuring (and suppressing) dialogic processes by virtue of its 
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reinforcement of dominant discourses about value and authority.  Central to 
this analysis is the unearthing of the power relationships that establish 
where that authority should lie. 
[T]he notion of the dialogic requires precisely an investigation of the 
power relations that inform and shape any discourse.  It calls for an 
investigation of the social institutions that control who speaks, in what 
situation, and with what force.210 
Copyright is one such institution.  The notion of the dialogic therefore 
calls for an investigation into copyright, the power relations that it sustains 
and perpetuates, and the discourses of value and authority that it informs 
and replicates.  In a culture such as ours, characterized by corporate 
ownership of cultural texts and images, it is not hard to imagine where such 
an investigation would lead. 
As it relates to the core concepts of copyright theory—constructions of 
the author, the processes authorship, the value of works, and the institution 
of copyright as a whole—this discussion demonstrates the role that feminist 
theory can play in the re-imagination of copyright.  Feminist literary 
theorists have met the challenges presented by the author-subject and its 
de/re-construction with an appeal to dialogism and the constant interplay of 
voices, texts, and discourses that create the cultural noise in which we exist 
and upon which our subjectivity depends.211  Copyright theory, which also 
needs to survive the de/re-construction of the Romantic author, can learn 
from this approach; it should acknowledge the historical contingency of the 
author-figure, the social situation of the author-speaker, and the dialogic 
nature of the authored text.  It should also examine the role that the 
institution of copyright plays in silencing counter discourses, attributing 
authority to speakers, and allocating power over speech. 
D. Feminist Theory and the Atomistic Self 
1. Political Theory, Copyright, and the Self 
As suggested above, the tension in literary theory between competing 
versions of authorship parallels a similar tension between competing 
conceptualizations of selfhood in social and political theory.  The liberal 
theory of the self as an autonomous self-determining subject has been 
widely accused of denying the social and interdependent nature of the 
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human self;212 the competing communitarian vision of the socially 
constituted and encumbered self has also been criticized, in this case for 
foreclosing possibilities of genuine agency, autonomy, and change.213  
Feminist legal theorists have sought to resolve the dilemma by dissolving 
the binary opposition between social construction and individual agency.214  
In this section, I will outline the core concepts of relational feminism that 
have provided a route towards this end and explore their possible 
implications in the field of copyright law. 
It is important, at this juncture, to underscore the connection between 
conceptions of authorship and conceptions of selfhood per se.  The 
following passage by Shelley Wright captures this relationship and is worth 
reproducing in full. 
The existing definition of copyright as both economic and personal 
within a political or civil context presupposes that individuals live in 
isolation from one another, that the individual is an autonomous unit who 
creates artistic works and sells them, or permits their sale by others, 
while ignoring the individual’s relationship with others within her 
community, family, ethnic group, religion—the very social relations out 
of which and for the benefit of whom the individual’s limited monopoly 
rights are supposed to exist.  The community has only the most tenuous 
identity.  Society itself is seen as an aggregate of anomic individuals, 
each separate, segregated, fragmented, and existing only as subjects of 
circumscribed civil rights, including the right to consume what others 
produce or create within limited ‘fair dealing’ or ‘fair use’ provisions.  
This vision undercuts to a large extent the social justification for 
monopoly rights as they exist in copyright and places the emphasis on 
the individual rights of the artist as a ‘creator’ and the artist, or her 
publisher, as a producer of saleable commodities.215 
Highlighted here is, first, that the construction of the author reflects a 
particular vision of the self, and, second, that this individualized vision of 
the self inevitably undermines the social reasons for which the copyright 
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system exists.216  Wright continues, “[I]ndividuals . . . are the products of 
their community, culture, and society.  The production of artistic works 
assists in creating this culture, this sense of community, and the 
psychological content of individuals themselves both as creators and as 
communicants of creation.”217  Reframing the self within the community 
complicates the individualized self that plays the role of copyright’s 
original author.  The subject matter of copyright is not the independently 
produced and individually owned work-as-object, but rather a contribution 
to the continually evolving culture in which the author exists and by which 
she is constituted. 
Built upon the ontological assumptions that inform liberal thought, and 
the normative ideals that inform possessive individualism, the current 
copyright model is not well equipped to recognize either the communal and 
communicative nature of cultural expression or the significance of that 
expression to the society and the communicator.218  If copyright is to 
encourage such cultural expression while also respecting the interests of the 
public to access and engage with the expression, it must first be capable of 
recognizing the nature and significance of its subject matter.  The re-
imagination of copyright therefore necessitates a challenge to the robust 
individualism of the pre-social, liberal self.219 
2. Political Theory and the Feminist Dilemma 
Perhaps the greatest challenge to liberalism’s conception of selfhood in 
recent decades has come from the school of thought categorized as 
communitarianism.220  While communitarianism resists any attempt at 
sweeping definition, it has more or less crystallized around a critique of 
liberal individualism premised upon social constructionism and the public 
good.221  Unifying communitarian thought is the rejection of a liberal 
                                                          
 216. Id. at 74. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See RANDALL, supra note 13, at 58-59 (noting that the identity of the individual 
author is not natural or essential, but formed in part by the cultural discourse in which she 
participates (through her artistic expression):  “an insight that is thoroughly pre-modern and 
only appears modern or postmodern in the light of Romantic presuppositions about the 
individuality of identity”). 
 219. See FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 213, at 45 (noting that in the liberal tradition, the 
moral status of an individual is derived from a conception of the individual as pre-social, 
possessing essential, individual characteristics before entering society as an embodied 
person).  With respect to the Rawlsian theory, “the ontological conception of the person as 
pre-social and transcendent feeds into an ethical conception of the paramount importance of 
individual rights and negative liberties, and the value of individuality.”  Id. at 46. 
 220. See, e.g., Shlomo Avineri & Avner de-Shalit, Introduction to COMMUNITARIANISM 
AND INDIVIDUALISM 1, 1 (Shlomo Avineri & Avner de-Shalit eds., 1992). 
 221. See FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 213, at 102.  See generally ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE:  A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984) (1981) (arguing that 
moral discourse and practice in the contemporary world is hollow and reinvigorating 
 2007] RECONSTRUCTING THE AUTHOR-SELF 251 
theory of the self as essentially pre-social, and the community as merely 
contingent and instrumental.222  According to communitarians, the self can 
be understood only in the context of his or her community, culture, and 
values, and in light of the social processes and institutions that have shaped 
them; the self is not “unencumbered” but always-already situated, identity 
is not innate but intersubjective, and the community is not external but 
constitutive.223  As Sandel explains: “For [its members], community 
describes not just what they have as fellow citizens but also what they are, 
not a relationship they choose (as in a voluntary association) but an 
attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of their 
identity.”224 
Communitarian concern with the metaphysics of social construction is 
not limited to a methodological claim—it translates into a normative 
discourse.  It makes sense that the socially situated individual is concerned 
for the kind of society in which she exists, that she might hold obligations 
to other members of the community (as opposed to merely rights wielded 
against them), and that the values, norms, and goals of the community 
might be shared and regarded as her own.225  Thus, the social construction 
theory of the self flows into a social constructionist approach to political 
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and moral value and a concern with “public goods” often lacking in the 
liberal landscape.226 
Of course, feminists have expressed a similar disenchantment with the 
liberal conception of personhood.227  Because it overlooks the socially 
situated nature of the self, liberalism’s individual is essentially 
disembodied, and social relations such as sex, class, and race are rendered 
invisible.228  This precludes sufficient acknowledgement of social injustice 
experienced as a result of group identity, legitimizes the problematic 
public-private distinction behind which myriad oppressions lurk,229 and 
simply denies the connected sense of self that many women experience in 
their lives.230  Thus, it is a common thread amongst much feminist theory 
that “[a] person’s critical, political consciousness can only be explained in 
terms of this socially situated conception of the self in which individual 
agency is not fully analysable in pre-social terms.”231 
There may appear to be a neat convergence between the feminist critique 
of degendered, universalizable conceptions of the self and communitarian 
objections to the ahistorical and atomistic individual of liberal political 
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theory.232  The communitarian conception of the constitutive community is 
attractive to feminists and other critical social theorists who take issue with 
the isolated rights-bearing individual.233  However, while it may be 
“commonplace amongst communitarians, socialists and feminists alike that 
liberalism is to be rejected for its excessive ‘individualism’ or 
‘atomism,’”234 feminists cannot simply appeal to communitarianism as an 
adequate solution to the shortcomings of modern political thought. 
The crux of the problem is the apparent absence of political potential 
within communitarian scholarship: 
[A]lthough communitarians take on board a critique of liberal 
individualism and purport to recognise the constitutive role of the social 
in our identity, they have so far stopped short of any genuinely political 
analysis or critique of the very community institutions whose importance 
they acknowledge.235 
At best, the failure of communitarianism to generate any substantive 
political critique of the community institutions that constitute our identities 
leaves it disappointingly impotent.236  At worst, this failure is merely 
symptomatic of a distinctly conservative undertone in communitarian 
thought, manifested in propensity to idealize even oppressive communities, 
and so to rationalize the status quo.237 
Feminism needs a critique of individualistic social ontology, but it also 
demands a critical capacity to evaluate and denounce the communities, 
traditions, and institutions that it recognizes as constitutive.  Perhaps most 
importantly, it must be fully capable of perceiving the power relations that 
exist within and between these various communities;238 questions of 
comparative disadvantage and power-disparity are notably absent from the 
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 237. See id. at 173-74. 
 238. Cf. Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in 
FEMINISM AND COMMUNITY, 233, 237-40 (Penny A. Weiss & Marilyn Friedman eds., 1995) 
(discussing the differences between the concepts of Individualism and Community). 
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works of prominent communitarians such as MacIntyre or Sandel.239  
Communitarianism therefore fails to provide a foundation for feminist 
critique at a political level; indeed, it largely fails to provide an account of 
how women, in the context of their communities, can develop a critical 
consciousness at all. 
On this communitarian view of personhood, the woman who lives in a 
sexist and patriarchal culture is peculiarly powerless.  For she cannot 
find any jumping-off point for a critique of the dominant conception of 
value: her position as a socially constructed being seems to render her a 
helpless victim of her situation . . . .  How is she to attain any measure of 
critical consciousness, so as to move towards the formation of alternative 
communities, alternative definitions[?]240 
Once again, feminism encounters its dilemma.  The challenge for 
feminists who believe in the socially situated self is to provide a coherent 
account of selfhood that permits sufficient subjectivity for a person to 
“comprehend her situation in critical terms”241 and sufficient agency for her 
to engage with and shape the community that shapes her.242  Feminism has 
therefore tackled head-on the “difficulties inherent in building a theory 
(and practice) that adequately reflects both the social and the individual 
nature of human beings.”243 
3. Relational Feminism: Rethinking the Self 
I cannot hope to canvas all of the ways in which feminist political and 
legal theorists have attempted to address this dilemma.  Rather, I have 
chosen to appeal to the notion of “relational feminism” as one potential 
route towards resolving the tension between individualism and 
communitarianism.244  While feminist scholarship generally insists upon 
                                                          
 239. See Weiss, supra note 229, at 165. (“From a feminist perspective, most centrally 
affecting the formation of the self are factors such as sex, age, race, sexuality, and class. Yet 
about such things most nonfeminist communitarians are peculiarly hushed . . . . [The 
communitarian notion of social context] omits such traditions and practices as sexism and 
racism, practices that may have a larger role in forming the self and determining one’s social 
place than do cities or neighbourhoods . . . .  Such forces . . . not only often create distinct 
communities (the ‘lesbian community,’ Boy Scouts, etc.) but also establish relations that 
pervade and structure all communities.”). 
 240. FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 213, at 151. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See id. at 175 (explaining that because communitarians see the social dilemma as 
disintegration, their response is connection, yet the problem for women has not been 
isolation and lack of dedication, and the feminist substitute is neither connection nor 
separation, it also entails a re-examination of engendered institutions such as the family and 
the sexual division of labor). 
 243. Nedelsky, supra note 227, at 8. 
 244. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION 
AND AMERICAN LAW 194 (1990) (stating that one aspect of relational feminist scholarship is 
the search for wholes and relationships instead of simply separate parts, along with the 
emphasis of experience and intuition); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as 
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the inter-subjective nature of being, it is concerned with freeing women to 
shape their own lives, to write their own narratives, to create themselves.  
Rather than emphasizing only situatedness, feminists therefore stress the 
need to renegotiate our gendered identities and the terms of our 
subjectivity.  For relational feminists, the key to this renegotiation lies in 
the very network of relations and cultural narratives that are commonly 
perceived as a threat to our subjectivity; according to relational feminism, 
they are also the route towards autonomy and self-identity.245 
a. The Relational Self 
The starting point for a relational account of the self is “an attention both 
to the individuality of human beings and to their essentially social 
nature.”246  The aspirational society is one that structures relations in such a 
way that communities and relationships foster, rather than undermine, self-
worth and individual autonomy.247  Thus, the concepts of autonomy and 
individuality survive the rejection of atomistic individualism and the appeal 
to social constructionism. 
The re-imagination of autonomy provides the centrepiece to relational 
feminism.248  The need for a genuine conception of autonomy is essential to 
the feminist political project,249 but the traditional liberal portrayal of 
autonomy as freedom, independence, and self-determination misses the 
mark.  If we take as a starting point the intrinsic sociality of human beings, 
then interdependence is not the antithesis of autonomy, but its 
precondition.250  If interdependence is a “constant component of 
                                                          
Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 11 (1993) (refusing to summarize the communitarian 
versus liberal individualism debate); Nedelsky, supra note 227, at 8 (stating that feminist 
views and demands guide the inquiry into resolving the tension between individualism and 
communitarianism by pointing to dangers, defining aspirations and indicating the contours 
of an approach to solve the issue); see also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 152-55 (1982) (discussing the 
process of individuation in terms of the changes in a person’s relationships with him or 
herself and to the rest of the world); Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Toward a 
Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 22; cf. CATHERINE KELLER, FROM A 
BROKEN WEB: SEPARATION, SEXISM, AND SELF 233 (1986) (analyzing the tensions between 
religion and claiming that religion is what an individual does privately, yet it is also a social 
event). See generally Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988) 
(reviewing the difference between cultural feminism and radical feminism and finding that 
both say something true about the female experience). 
 245. See, e.g., Nedelsky, supra note 227, at 21 (“The collective is not simply a potential 
threat to individuals, but is constitutive of them, and thus is a source of their autonomy as 
well as a danger to it.”). 
 246. Id. at 22. 
 247. See id. 
 248. See Susan H. Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society, 72 IND. L.J. 417, 
426-27 (1997). 
 249. See id. at 427. 
 250. See Nedelsky, supra note 227, at 12; Williams, supra note 248, at 435 (“[O]ne 
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autonomy,” genuine autonomy is only realizable through the human 
interactions that allow it to develop and flourish.251  If autonomy is 
understood to mean the capacity to find and live by one’s own law, that law 
and the capacity to find it can only develop in the context of relations with 
others.252  An adequate theory of autonomy must therefore understand 
autonomy in relational and not individualistic terms: “It is relationships, 
from child-parent, to student-teacher, to client-state, as well as patterns of 
relationship among citizens, that make actualization of the human potential 
for autonomy possible.”253 
In the context of constructive relationships, Jennifer Nedelsky casts the 
agency and autonomy of the relational self in terms of a human capacity for 
self-creation: “a capacity that means we are never fully determined by our 
relationships or our given material circumstances. . . .  We are always in a 
creative process of interaction, of mutual shaping, with all the dimensions 
of our existence.”254  Susan Williams understands this creative process as 
narrative agency—the capacity to engage in an ongoing process of 
evaluation, interpretation, and reinterpretation of one’s experiences and 
life-story.255  In other words, “the self is a creature in and of the world, but 
one capable of at least partially transforming herself through thought, 
criticism, and self-interpretation.”256  With its commitment to 
interdependence, community, agency, and individuality, relational theory 
provides the solution to feminism’s political and ontological dilemma: 
The notion of the relational self, . . . nicely captures our empirical and 
logical interdependence and the centrality to our identity of our relations 
with others and with practices and institutions, whilst retaining an idea of 
human uniqueness and discreteness as central to our sense of ourselves. 
It entails the collapse of any self/other or individual/community 
dichotomy without abandoning the idea of genuine agency and 
                                                          
cannot be an autonomous person in isolation; one can only be autonomous in relationships 
with other persons.”); see also DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL CHOICE 40 
(1989) (criticizing the reduction of personal autonomy to a special case of free will because 
it does not address the issue of how an individual can live in harmony with his or her 
authentic self). 
 251. See Nedelsky, supra note 227, at 21; see also FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 213, at 
180 (“On the relational conception of subjectivity, autonomy can still claim its place as an 
important value, but our conception of autonomy is no longer of separateness in the sense of 
isolation.  Rather we can see that autonomy . . . typically depends not only on background 
facilities and welfare levels but also on our relations with others. My autonomy depends not 
just on others’ or the state’s leaving me alone, but in others’ acknowledgement of, respect 
for and support towards me.”). 
 252. See Nedelsky, supra note 227, at 11. 
 253. Nedelsky, supra note 141, at 133. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See Williams, supra note 248, at 427-28. 
 256. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 888 (1994). 
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subjectivity.257 
b. Rights as Relationship 
The notion of the relational self challenges the liberal conception of the 
autonomous individual as an independent bearer of rights to be wielded 
against others and the state.258  The role of rights in feminist discourse is 
therefore another facet of the dilemma that feminists face in the liberal-
communitarian debate.  This rights-bearing individual is the protagonist of 
liberalism, and the epitome of individualism.  However, in the context of a 
struggle for substantive equality, feminists generally refuse to abandon the 
notion of rights as a political tool, even while rejecting the rights-fetishism 
of the liberal political order.  As with autonomy, the concept of rights must 
be retained but re-imagined. 
In liberal thought, rights take the form of limits to democratic outcomes, 
constraints upon collective choices, and boundaries between citizens.  
Rights are portrayed as innate to the individual, and human relations are 
cast in terms of clashing rights and interests.  In contrast, from a relational 
perspective, human interaction is seen primarily “in terms of the way 
patterns of relationship can develop and sustain both an enriching 
collective life and the scope for genuine individual autonomy.”259  Rights, 
in this picture, do not simply mediate the boundaries of individual self-
interest: they encapsulate collective choices about the values that we, as 
members of this society, hold most dear.  These values are neither innate 
nor trans-temporal but evolve with society over time.  As such, they are 
best understood in terms of relationships because “the shifting quality of 
those basic values makes more sense when our focus is on the structure of 
relations that fosters those values.”260 
In liberal thought, property rights epitomize the role attributed to rights 
in general.261  Property represents the boundaries of the individual’s private 
sphere and a limit upon the powers of the state and fellow citizens.262  It has 
been suggested that the symbolic power of traditional property flows in part 
                                                          
 257. FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 213, at 178. 
 258. See Nedelsky, supra note 227, at 20-21. 
 259. Id. at 8 (recognizing that society, community, and relationships are still relevant to 
liberal individualists); see also Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, in 
COMMUNITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM 205, 217 (Shlomo Avineri & Avner de-Shalit eds., 
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 260. Nedelsky, supra note 244, at 9. 
 261. See Nedelsky, supra note 141, at 132 (advancing that when rights are regarded as 
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 262. See Nedelsky, supra note 227, at 15-18. 
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from its apparent concreteness, which lends materiality to the personal 
space claimed by the rights bearer and makes it easy to identify violations 
and resultant harm.263  As lawyers know, however, this conceptual 
tendency to physicalize property belies its nature.  Property rights are 
primarily about relations between persons and not the material things that 
are owned.264  Moreover, there is nothing about property rights that make 
them intrinsic or pre-social: their significance is entirely dependent upon 
the rules and guarantees of the state.265  Like any other right, then, property 
rights represent a collective, democratic choice about structuring relations 
of power and responsibility in society.  Property rights may give the owner 
protection against the collective, but they have their source in the 
collective. 
Relational feminism thus recasts individual rights as relational: rights are 
not things to be wielded by individuals in defence of their personal sphere 
but are instead vehicles that “construct relationships—of power, of 
responsibility, of trust, of obligation.”266  Debates about the substance or 
scope of rights should not begin and end with the claim or denial of right 
(which only obfuscates the underlying issues) but should instead focus 
upon the kinds of human relationships the right would structure, and the 
values that would be furthered by its guarantee.267 
c. Dialogic Communitarianism 
In light of the role played by “dialogism” in feminist literary criticism 
and the collapse of structure/agency dichotomies, it is interesting to note 
the significance accorded to dialogue in relational feminism’s theory of 
selfhood.  This is perhaps captured best in the work of Nicola Lacey and 
Elizabeth Frazer, who appeal to the concept of “dialogic communitarian”268 
                                                          
 263. See id. at 23. 
 264. See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
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as a means by which to move beyond the binary oppositions of the liberal-
communitarian debate: 
This ideal is dialogic in the sense that it assumes democratic institutions 
providing real access to political processes for all citizens. It is both 
dialogic and communitarian in the sense of proceeding from the 
relational theory of the self, recognising the importance of both dialogue 
and identification with various ‘communities’ in the constitution of 
subjectivity and human identity, and it is communitarian in the sense of 
placing questions of both public goods and the institutions needed to 
support them, and the ideal of collective life based on mutual acceptance 
and recognition, at the heart of politics.269 
Taking as their starting point a theory of the “relational self,” Frazer and 
Lacey argue that a commitment to dialogue is essential for the ongoing 
scrutiny and negotiation of power relations within communities and social 
structures.270  This necessitates both an awareness of the power that inheres 
in practices and discourses and attention to the value and audibility of 
members’ voices.271  Substantive access to informed political debate and 
the capacity to be heard are central to the dialogic communitarian ideal.272 
According to dialogic communitarianism, subjectivity requires 
discursive engagement: the capacity to listen to the claims of others and to 
articulate one’s own.273  Feminism’s appeal to the practice of interactive 
consciousness-raising is an example of transformative politics through 
dialogic process.274  The collective practice of exchanging personal 
accounts and experiences generates a critically reflective capacity, creating 
opportunities for women to better understand themselves and their social 
condition.  Related to this practice is the similar but more self-conscious art 
form of “narrative” creation.275  The creation of narrative is essentially 
                                                          
Theory: Beyond Tragedy and Complacency, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 693, 696-98 (1987); Drucilla 
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 273. See id. at 208. 
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“story-telling,” which aims to give voice to women’s experiences, but also, 
through the processes of communication and sharing, to facilitate human 
connection across difference.276  Narrative is self-evidently situated and 
perspectival, but it is also creative (in its construction and interpretation) 
and potentially reconstructive (in its political power).277  As such, it is 
another tool with which feminists have tempered the implications of social 
constructionism: 
[T]here is enough of a story-teller in all of us to create a coherent, if 
unstable self. Yet the narrative speaker is not simply an outspoken 
incarnation of the pre-existing, bounded individual of modernist thought; 
she must contend with the social forces that continually threaten to 
destroy her carefully crafted sense of self.278 
The use of narrative is also said to temper the postmodern deconstruction 
of the Woman by recreating a meaningful connection amongst women 
through their gendered realities.  “Narrative thus straddles the postmodern 
divide between a unified, essentialist meaning of womanhood and no 
meaning at all; the narrating self is a woman-in-process.”279 
At the foundation of consciousness-raising, narrative creation, and 
dialogic communitarianism more broadly, dynamic interaction with others 
in a process of dialogic exchange, both interpersonal and intrapersonal, 
constitutes identity and subjectivity.280  It is through this dialogic process of 
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 278. Id. at 1275. 
 279. Id. at 1276. 
 280. Having deconstructed the unity of subjectivity and acknowledged the shifting and 
multiple nature of the communities within which the fragmented subject is constituted, our 
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interpreting and ordering experiences, discourses, and social forces that the 
socially-situated subject of feminist ontology is able to exercise the agency 
demanded of her by feminist politics. 
4. Relational Theory, Authorship, and Copyright 
My aim in exploring these elements of relational feminism has been to 
reveal the potential for a notion of subjectivity that acknowledges the 
connectedness of the human subject without engulfing it within its social 
situation and so denying individuality, difference, and creative capacity.  
My purpose, of course, is to draw from this some lessons for the law of 
copyright.  Authorship is an essentially human project, and constructions of 
authorship are thus essentially bound to conceptions of the human self.  I 
argue that the author in copyright law is postulated in unequivocally liberal 
terms.  It is my suggestion that copyright theory can draw upon the lessons 
of relational feminism to re-imagine the nature of the author-self (which 
will in turn necessitate the re-imagination of copyright itself). 
a. The Relational Author 
As Nedelsky has noted, there is “inherent tension between the idea of 
autonomy as both originating with oneself and being conditioned and 
shaped by one’s social context.  Those tensions are the tensions of 
feminism, and they come from feminism’s recognition of the nature of 
human beings.”281  Similarly, I would suggest there is an inherent tension 
between the idea of authorship as both originating within oneself and being 
derived from the social and cultural context within which the author 
creates.  These are the tensions of copyright.  Copyright’s failure to 
adequately recognize the essentially social nature of human creativity 
obscures these tensions, and so misrepresents the processes of authorship.  
Copyright needs a relational theory of the author-self. 
Far from the individualized, self-determining author of modern copyright 
law, the “relational author” is always-already situated within, and 
constituted by, the communities in which she exists, and the texts and 
discourses by which she is surrounded.  Far from creating independently 
and choosing relationships through the vehicle of copyright qua private 
property, the author necessarily creates from within a network of social 
relations: she is not individualizable, and her works of authorship cannot be 
regarded in isolation.  It follows that the author’s works are not 
“independent” creations and they do not originate from the author alone. 
However, this does not mean that author and authorship are illusory or 
obsolete.  A relational theory of authorship recognizes the social dimension 
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of the author, but also her duality: she encapsulates both our connectedness 
and our capacity for critical reflection.282  As we have seen, relational 
feminism regards the self as continuously engaged in a “creative process of 
interaction, of mutual shaping, with all the dimensions of our existence.”283  
When we conceive of autonomy as the freedom and ability to construct 
one’s own narrative and to project this narrative of the self into the 
world,284 the self takes on the role as both actor and author.  The scene is 
set, and the role is given, but the relational self has the creative capacity to 
improvise, to refuse direction, to re-write the ending.  It is easy to find, in 
the creative process of authorship, an instantiation of this capacity for 
creative agency upon which relational feminism insists. 
In an effort to explain the duality of the relational self as both socially 
constituted (determined) and possessing narrative autonomy (creative), 
Susan Williams’ words also provide insight into the duality of the author-
self: 
[T]he difference between creativity and determinism may simply be a 
difference in the degree of complexity in the causal sequence.  It is not 
that anything is uncaused, but that the influences on a given human being 
are so many, varied, and interacting that at some point it becomes 
meaningless to ascribe causality to any useful subset of those 
influences.285 
Similarly, in the processes of authorship, the texts, discourses, 
experiences, and relationships that constitute the author are combined, 
interpreted, reinterpreted, and retold.  What emerges from the authorial 
process is not original in the sense of having emerged ex nihilo, but it is 
nonetheless the author’s creation in the only sense that matters.  When 
Williams describes narrative autonomy, she might easily be describing 
authorship: 
[T]he activity of narrative construction—of interpretation and 
reinterpretation—begins, of course, from the materials at hand.  That is, 
a person works with her own experiences and the stories, values, and 
concepts that are available to her in whatever culture(s) she inhabits.  
These materials are always, and from the beginning, both given and 
created.  They are given in that they are shaped by forces beyond any 
individual’s control; they are created in that each new repetition of such 
[] cultural and personal artifacts is always a reinterpretation rather than 
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merely a replication.286 
In the same way, the materials of authorship are both given and created.  
The relational author must always create from the materials around her, but 
the authorial process is one of reinterpretation, recombination, and so 
transformation.  The influences upon the author are so many, and the 
sources so various, that we can call this process authorial creativity. 
b. Relational Copyright 
A relational theory of the author has implications for the nature of 
copyright.  In the relational model, copyright cannot play the role attributed 
to traditional property rights in liberal political theory.  Due to the 
ubiquitous property analogy, copyright lends itself to similar reification (in 
spite of its intangible nature) and so threatens to occupy a similar role in an 
individual rights-based analysis.  Additionally, because copyright is so 
often rationalized in Lockean terms (whereby the author’s intellectual labor 
is rewarded), it lends itself to categorization as a “natural right.”287  
Applying the lessons of relational feminism, the individual liberty and 
natural rights-based accounts of copyright are untenable. 
The author’s right is not reducible to an individual entitlement that limits 
the actions of others.  Although few would dispute this broad claim, its 
implications have yet to be grasped in principle or realized in practice.  
Copyright must be understood in relational terms: it structures relationships 
between authors and users, allocating powers and responsibilities amongst 
members of cultural communities, and establishing the rules of 
communication and exchange.  To assess the nature of copyright with 
reference only to the copyright owner’s private sphere of entitlement is to 
undermine its normative significance.  The importance of copyright lies in 
its capacity to structure relations of communication, and also to establish 
the power dynamics that will shape these relations.  Its purpose is to 
maximize communication and exchange by putting in place incentives for 
the creation and dissemination of intellectual works.  Relational feminism 
can teach us that an individualized account of the copyright holder’s right 
will disregard the significance of the relationships affected by copyright 
and will be blind to the power dimensions and social implications of the 
copyright system.  It is therefore imperative that society not regard 
copyright as just another brick in “erecting a wall (of rights) between the 
individual and those around him.”288 
Relational feminists do not ascribe to the notion of the individual as 
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possessor of rights and interests that precede her entrance into civil society 
as an embodied person.  Such rights or interests as she has under the law 
and against the collective are only the culmination of collective choices that 
have been made about the kind of society in which she should live, and the 
kind of relationships and values that should be fostered.  From this 
perspective, it makes no sense to talk of the author’s natural right to own 
the fruits of her intellectual labor, nor to compare the authorial act to the 
picking of acorns in the state of nature.  There is no prior, transcendent 
entitlement for the political powers that be to respect in the name of 
legitimate government; there is only a choice about the kind of intellectual 
creativity and exchange that we want to see in our society, and the relations 
of communication that are likely to foster it.  Copyright only exists because 
the state creates and defines it, and the state only creates and defines it to 
the extent that it is enforceable through state mechanisms.  A relational 
theory of copyright thus repudiates any notion of copyright as a natural 
right of the author—it is simply the result of democratic, political decision-
making, and subject to revision as a result of shifting values, changing 
circumstances, or the need to redress imbalances of power. 
It follows that the claim to authorial right only obfuscates the real issues 
underlying policy debates about the strength and scope of copyright.  The 
language of copyright and intellectual property is unfortunate because it 
contains a rhetorical power to foreclose debate,289 and like any invocation 
of right or entitlement, has the tendency to “obscure rather than clarify 
what is at issue, what people are really after.”290  The lessons of relational 
feminism reveal that the copyright system, as the result of a collective 
choice, always requires evaluation and re-evaluation.291  In particular, we 
must be attentive to the relationships of power and responsibility that it 
generates and ask ourselves whether they foster the kind of creativity that 
we value.292  By regarding copyright as relational and resisting its 
reification in the form of property, we open the door to debate about its 
subject matter, its scope, its goals, and its consequences.293  At this moment 
in history, where traditional copyright concepts are critically challenged by 
new technologies and the activities they facilitate, the future direction of 
copyright depends upon our readiness to debate these issues. 
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c. Authorship as Dialogic Process 
The final lesson to be drawn from a relational-feminist inquiry into 
copyright relates to the dialogic nature of the authorial creation.  As we 
have seen, relational feminism stresses the central role of dialogue and 
narrative in the process of shaping social practices, institutions, discourses, 
and, of course, the self.294  A relational theory of copyright should regard 
authorship as participatory and dialogic.  When the author creates original 
expression in the form of literature, art, drama, or music, she engages in an 
intrapersonal dialogue (developing a form of personal narrative by drawing 
upon experience, situation, and critical reflection) and an interpersonal 
dialogue (drawing upon the texts and discourses around her to 
communicate meaning to an anticipated audience).  Authorship, like the 
feminist conception of narrative, is a way to develop one’s voice, to 
communicate, and so to interact with others in and across communities.  It 
is a way to generate meaning and establish one’s individuality, but also to 
connect with others in relations of communication.  This is the dual nature 
of authorship. 
By understanding authorship as a dialogic process rather than a single 
unitary act, we can recognize facets of authorship that copyright law has, 
traditionally, either neglected or undermined.  We must understand the 
author’s works in their social context and examine her acquired rights in 
relation to her audience and other members of her communicative 
communities.  There is no vacuum around the creative process, and no wall 
surrounding the author and her expression.  With her original expression 
the creative author is entering a cultural conversation that has been going 
on long before she appeared, and one that will continue long after she 
leaves.  Whatever she adds will therefore incorporate and respond to that 
which has already been said; and she must trust that her contribution will 
inform what others say after her.  In other words, the dialogic nature of 
authorship reveals the cumulative nature of cultural creativity. 
The author can only generate meaning using the texts, discourses, and 
experiences that she has encountered, and all original expression is, in this 
sense, derivative.  The creation of meaning through imitation, 
incorporation, or transformation of pre-existing texts should, therefore, be 
recognizable as a central component of original authorship.  This does not 
“diminish the merit” of authorship, but accurately describes the creative 
process that copyright is meant to encourage.295  A copyright system 
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 295. See Litman, supra note 39, at 1011 (“My characterization of authorship as a 
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shaped by a dialogic theory of authorship would, therefore, embrace 
creative forms that are currently marginalized, chilled, or declared unlawful 
because of the use that they make of pre-existing, protected works.  It 
follows that the rights we establish over intellectual expression must leave 
room for others to engage in a similar communicative process; when others 
enter the cultural conversation they must be free to acknowledge, respond 
to, and build upon the contribution the author has made.  A dialogic theory 
of authorship thus reveals the necessary limitations of copyright’s 
protective sphere if it is to facilitate authorial contributions to the cultural 
conversation. 
III. CONCLUSION: A FEMINIST THEORY OF AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT 
Copyright’s conception of the author is dependent upon a particular 
conception of the self.  In calling for a re-imagination of the author-figure 
that occupies the protagonist’s role in modern copyright, I am appealing to 
the de-/reconstruction of selfhood that has been a central component of 
(post)modern political philosophy and theorizing but from which the 
structures of intellectual property have remained stubbornly immune.  As a 
member of groups, communities, and society, and a participant in cultural 
and political dialogue, the author cannot be individualized without being 
stripped of the very characteristics that make her an author.  Authors exist 
within, and create out of a community, culture, and society; in turn, through 
their creative capacity, their works shape that culture and community.  We 
must therefore understand authorship within the context of cultural 
dialogue and participative processes, and in recognition of its audience and 
the public as a whole. 
Attempts to recast the author as something other than that the originating 
individual tend to have taken the form of criticisms of romantic authorship, 
usually drawing upon poststructuralist accounts of the “death of the 
author.”296  These important contributions to copyright scholarship have not 
had the desired impact, most likely because the notion of the author is 
clearly alive and well.297  From a policy perspective, insisting upon the 
death of the author is a non-starter; from a theoretical perspective, any 
attempt to assimilate the author’s death into copyright law can only spell 
the death of copyright itself.298  Copyright needs the author, but it is not 
                                                          
disservice to the authors it seeks to describe.”). 
 296. Aoki, supra note 94, at 811. 
 297. See id. at 811-25 (arguing that the resilience and continued potency of the Romantic 
author notion in modern copyright law is evidence of the fact that claims about the “death of 
the author” have been exaggerated). 
 298. See id.  Aoki argues that because literary theory takes the disappearance of the 
author as a given, any attempt to assimilate this theory directly into copyright would be a 
mistake. Id. 
 2007] RECONSTRUCTING THE AUTHOR-SELF 267 
sheer pragmatism that allows copyright’s author-figure to survive her brush 
with death: there is something intuitive about the idea of the author as, in 
some sense at least, the source of the words, notes, actions, and images that 
she creates.  There is something about the idea of creativity, individuality, 
ability, that we are unwilling to discard.  Even in the face of social 
constructionism and the fragmentation of the stable, unified self, something 
that looks like author/authorship persists.  The task for copyright theory is 
to begin to define that something in the absence of the masks and 
metaphors traditionally employed. 
Feminist theory, both literary and political, has taught us that the 
simplifying dichotomies of liberal thought (self/other, public/private, 
individual/community, autonomy/dependence) creates false dilemmas that 
impede our ability to engage in genuine debate and that obstruct our path 
towards nuanced solutions.  By regarding the self as both an individual and 
a member of multiple, shifting communities—an autonomous agent and 
socially constituted—feminism provides the route by which we can break 
down the simplifying dichotomies that pervade copyright theory 
(author/user, creator/copier, labourer/free-rider).  As an autonomous but 
socially constituted individual, the author is the product of her community 
and culture but capable of developing her own voice, constructing her own 
narrative, and making her own meaning out of the discourses that constitute 
her.  Her works are therefore the product of her communities, her culture, 
and her self.299 
This route leads us to a new understanding of authorship and so to a new 
appreciation of copyright’s task.  Employing a feminist theory of 
dialogism, we can rediscover the significance of authorship that adopts and 
adapts prior texts to create new meaning.  We can appreciate the nature of 
copyright as an institution that attributes value and authority to certain texts 
and speakers while silencing others and inquire into the power dynamics 
that inform it.  We can also perceive the importance of authorship as a 
dialogic process with the power to shape speakers, listeners, and 
communities, even as it reproduces established languages and discourses.  
Employing relational feminism, we can question the individualized account 
of the author by locating her (and her expression) within the communities 
and relationships in which she creates.  We can appreciate the nature of 
copyright as an institution that constructs relationships of communication 
between authors, users, and the public by allocating powers and 
responsibilities.  We can also perceive the nature of authorship as a form of 
dialogue through which individuals actively participate in a cultural 
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conversation.  All of these lessons culminate to underscore one essential 
proposition: a copyright system designed to encourage authorship must be 
capable of recognizing and valuing the derivative, collaborative, and 
communicative nature of creativity.  Only then will the rights that it grants 
be means—and not obstacles—to that end. 
 
